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The Ironies of Automation Law: Tying




Rapid developments in sensors, computing, and robotics,
including power, kinetics, control, telecommunication, and artificial
intelligence have presented opportunities to further integrate
sophisticated automation across society. With these opportunities come
questions about the ability of current laws and policies to protect
important social values new technologies may threaten. As
sophisticated automation moves beyond the cages of factories and
cockpits, the need for a legal approach suitable to guide an increasingly
automated future becomes more pressing. This Article analyzes
examples of legal approaches to automation thus far by legislative,
administrative, judicial, state, and international bodies. The case
studies reveal an interesting irony: while automation regulation is
intended to protect and promote human values, by focusing on the
capabilities of the automation, this approach results in less protection
of human values. The irony is similar to those pointed out by Lisanne
Bainbridge in 1983, when she described how designing automation to
improve the life of the operator using an automation-centered approach
actually made the operator's life worse and more difficult. The ironies
that result from automation-centered legal approaches are a product of
the neglect of the sociotechnical nature of automation: the
relationships between man and machine are situated and
interdependent, humans will always be in the loop, and reactive
policies ignore the need for general guidance for ethical and
accountable automation design and implementation. Like system
engineers three decades ago, policymakers must adjust the focus of
Meg Leta (Ambrose) Jones, J.D., Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor of Communication,
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legal treatment of automation to recognize the interdependence of man
and machine to avoid the ironies of automation law and meet the goals
of ethical integration. The Article proposes that the existing models
utilized for safe and actual implementation for automated system
design be supplemented with principles to guide ethical and
sociotechnical legal approaches to automation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, USS Vincennes military personnel shot down a
passenger jet carrying 290 civilians because their automated radar
system, which had been designed to detect Soviet bombers, initially
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identified the plane as an enemy and none of the crew was willing to
challenge the system's determination.1 The tragic event, and the
many that followed, have made us question our reliance on machines.
In 2005, two American amateur chess players beat a
supercomputer named Hydra and several teams of grandmasters in an
online chess tournament,2 taking home the $10,000 prize.3 The
"freestyle" tournament allowed anyone to compete alone, in teams, or
with computers. The humans and machine teams dominated the
supercomputers operating the same brute number-crunching
strategies in place since the 1970s. While the amateurs were far less
skilled than the grandmasters at chess strategy, they were far more
skilled with their computers. "Weak human + machine + better
process was superior to a strong computer alone and, more
remarkably, superior to a strong human + machine + inferior
process."'4 Pairing a human with a machine can significantly increase
desired performance beyond that which could be achieved by man or
machine separately. The line between achieving new feats and
catastrophic losses must be toed carefully, but so goes the reality of
technological innovation-technology is neither good nor bad. Nor is it
neutral. This is the first of Melvin Kranzberg's "Six Laws of
Technology," or "a series of truisms... deriving from a longtime
immersion in the study of the development of technology and its
interactions with sociocultural change.' 5 The second law is that
invention is the mother of necessity, and the third is that technology
comes in big and small packages.6 The fourth is that non-technical
factors take precedence in technology-policy decisions, and the fifth is
that "all history is relevant, but the history of technology is the most
relevant.' 7 His sixth law is technology is human-centric.8  Each of
these truths is either difficult to remember or difficult to realize in
everyday practice. It is arduous not to succumb to technological
1. David Evans, Vincennes: A Case Study, 119:8 Proceedings 49 (1993).
2. Dark Horse ZackS Wins Freestyle Chess Tournament, ChessBase Chess News (June
19, 2005), http://en.chessbase.com/post/dark-horse-zacks-wins-freestyle-che-tournament
[http://perma.cc/EX92-VQJY].
3. Freestyle Tournament for $20,000, ChessBase Chess News (May 9, 2005),
http://en.chessbase.com/Home/TabId/2 11/Postld4002379/freestyle-tournament-for-20-000.aspx
[http://perma.cc/C7QK-HVYV].
4. Garry Kasparov, The Chess Master and the Computer, N.Y. Rev. of Books (Feb. 11,
2010), http://www.nybooks.comlarticles/archives/2O10/feb/1 1/the-chess-master-and-the-
computer/?pagination=false [http://perma.cc/RBA8-F328].
5. Melvin Kranzberg, Technology and History: "Kranzberg's Laws," 27:3 TECHNOLOGY
AND CULTURE 544, 544 (1986).
6. Id. at 548.
7. Id. at 549.
8. Id. at 557.
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determinism-thinking that "technology is the prime factor in shaping
our lifestyles, values, institutions, and other elements of our
society"a--as we are faced with the "need" to continually adapt to new
forms of communicating with friends and family, upgrade our
organizations and skillsets to be competitive, and act upon values
never collaboratively established. The big, small, and connected
packages create complex ecologies that are difficult to navigate or
evaluate, but complex, international problems seem solvable by the
optimistic and computationally minded. In the face of extraordinary
and overwhelming technological integration, we must remind
ourselves of Marshall McLuhan's wise words: "There is absolutely no
inevitability as long as there is a willingness to contemplate what is
happening."10  Technology law scholars have taken different
approaches to contemplate what is happening. Many, if not most,
take a problem-based approach to sociotechnical issues. They identify
a new sociotechnical harm, breakdown and describe the relevant
technology, describe the shortcomings of existing law in addressing
the new harm, and propose changes.11 Others bravely engage in
debate over exceptionalism and the need to overhaul policy due to new
technology.12 A few have investigated "the pacing problem"-law's
inability to keep up with accelerating technological change.13 Still
others look back in history to find corollaries and lessons from the
past-no easy task when the topic is technology.1 4 This Article takes a
different perspective, borrowing a bit from each approach. Instead of
drawing lines that distinguish the many technology innovations
entering the world from "big data"15 analytics to sophisticated robots,
it ties them together under the umbrella of automation. Although it
may have once made sense to focus on information technologies that
offered a virtual existence or stationary robots isolated on factory
floors, the issues that arise from these technologies are merging as
9. Id. at 545.
10. MARSHALL McLuHAN & QUINTEN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE: AN
INVENTORY OF EFFECTS 25 (1996).
11. See A. Michael Froomkin & Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense Against Robots and Drones,
48 CONN. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2015).
12. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015).
13. See, e.g., THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-
ETHICAL OVERSIGHT: THE PACING PROBLEM 19 (Gary E. Marchant, Braden R. Allenby & Joseph
R. Herkert eds., 2011) [hereinafter GROWING GAP].
14. See, e.g., TIM WU, The Master Switch 19 (2010).
15. "Big data" is most often defined by its three Vs: velocity, variety, and volume.
Sometimes a fourth V, veracity, is included to describe the uncertainty associated with big data.
The term refers to the collection and use of very large amounts and types of information that are
produced and flow in at high rates to be analyzed and shared for various purposes.
[Vol. 18:1:77
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robots and screens attain intelligence and gain mobility. This Article
makes no comment on exceptionalism or the "newness" of new
technology; instead, it takes a step back and frames emerging
technologies in such a way to allow for both reflection and prediction.
By categorizing modern digital man-machine systems as automation,
one can look back, as we have always automated life, and inform the
future, wherein man-machine systems will change-but will
ultimately remain man-machine systems.
Through the broad lens of automation, reflection reveals the
law has not been particularly good at toeing the line between
achieving new feats and causing catastrophic losses. The law has
ignored the delicate interdependence between man and machine,
resulting in ineffective protection of specified value. Five case studies
of legal approaches to automation from across various contexts expose
an irony. When presented with an automation-related problem, law
and policy responses have been to preserve or protect an explicit value
by simply inserting or removing a human from the loop, which
actually ends up backfiring. The value stated by policymakers is more
vulnerable than before legal intervention occurs or the intended goals
of the policy are left further out of reach. Most automation used today
already has a well-established place in the world and has developed
ethical and legal treatment. The challenge is how to approach
emerging digital man-machine systems that carry with them so much
uncertainty and so much promise.
Sheila Jasanoff has called for a reexamination of human
control over technological systems in light of uncertainty and
unpredictability.16  Critical of American theorists that view
technological failings as avoidable error, Jasanoff finds the work of
German sociologist Ulrich Beck more encompassing.17 Beck's thesis of
"reflexive modernization" argues that risk is an inherent part of a
technically intensive society and describes risk as part of the modern
human condition, not cold, rationally calculated probabilities.18
Jasanoff argues for the development of a set of "technologies of
humility" or:
methods, or better yet institutionalized habits of thought, that try to come to grips with
the ragged fringes of human understanding[-] the unknown, the uncertain, the
ambiguous, and the uncontrollable. Acknowledging the limits of prediction and control,
technologies of humility confront 'head-on' the normative implications of our lack of
perfect foresight. They call for different expert capabilities and different forms of
16. Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing
Science, 41:3 MINERVA 223, 223-24 (2003).
17. Id. at 224.
18. See e.g., ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 22 (1992).
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engagement between experts, decision-makers, and the public than were considered
needful in the governance structures of high modernity. 19
Seeking to democratize the development and governance of
technology, Jasanoff provides a framework to promote more
meaningful interaction between corporate parties, policymakers,
technical experts, and the public.20  In order to achieve rich,
democratized deliberations, participation should focus on framing the
issues broadly enough to encompass more than cost-benefit analyses.
This participation should consider vulnerabilities of ordinary citizens
that do more than reduce those people to groups and populations
based on shared categorical characteristics, distribution of
consequences not only with an ethical conversation at the beginning
but throughout the development and deployment of technology, and
learning from the various interpretations of technological integrations
through collective reflection and assessment of alternative
explanations.21 By treating technology incrementally and broadening
the scope of consideration, this Article adjusts the framing of the issue
and attempts to provide a policy approach that is inclusive and
adaptive.
Before an emerging technology has sufficiently taken hold in
society, it is difficult to know what it is capable of and how it will be
used. While its technical capabilities may be known, others-as well
as users-may quickly adapt those capabilities in the market. What
innovative or nefarious uses the technology will facilitate are also
hard to imagine. These two unknowns make governance of emerging
technology quite challenging and lead to a pacing problem, in which
technological innovations outpace ethical and legal developments
intended to direct design and use.22  Traditional prescriptive
regulations can be too restrictive to allow for the flexibility required in
the design and implementation of human-automation systems and
responsible situated use.23 Policy innovations, like delegation and
self-governance, have developed to address a quickly evolving
technological landscape.24  These innovations have left many
frustrated, arguing the lack of protection and guidance is a
detrimental and deterministic approach to innovation. This Article
argues that any legal treatment must not mess with a well-formed
loop if the irony presented in the case studies is to be avoided.
19. Jasanoff, supra note 16, at 227.
20. Id. at 238-42.
21. Id.
22. GROWING GAP, supra note 13.
23. Infra Section IV.
24. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking,
and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DuKE L.J. 377, 386-87 (2006).
[Vol. 18:1:77
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Instead, a "policy knot"25 should be formed that utilizes existing "good"
design principles, enriches underdeveloped areas, and identifies and
fills important holes in the creation, integration, and implementation
of automation. Applying the policy-knot approach to automation
(specifically, automated decision making and self-driving cars) within
the framework of Jasanoff s technologies of humility, a set of seven
principles, the Fair Automation Practices Principles (FAPPs), is
derived. Using existing principles from automation design, human-
robot automation, and information policy, the FAPPs state that
automation design and use should involve: (1) informed risk
assessment, (2) transparent processes, (3) error detection and
correction, (4) consideration of sensitive situations, (5) diversity and
discrimination testing, (6) man and machine reallocation comparisons,
and (7) an inventory of the predictable and unpredictable.
Roboticist Illah Nourbakhsh, at the Carnegie Mellon Robotics
Institute, made a fairly big request of the law in his book Robot
Futures:
Instead of reacting case by case to new loopholes in law discovered by ever more
ingenious machines, our system of jurisprudence must proactively gather the expertise
and wherewithal to predict our robot future, debate the most critical issues of safety,
accountability, equality, and quality of life, and create a viable legal framework for this
century. Not only would such an exercise provide guide rails for future robot engineers
and businesses, it would also catalyze a public awareness that we are entering an
uncharted space but are girding ourselves with knowledge and moral authority to make
sense of our future.
26
This Article will attempt to contribute some guide rails. It
provides both a broad description of automation that allows many
overlapping technologies to be discussed simultaneously and an
expansive overview of automation design. The Article then makes
three novel contributions to an already-novel subject area. The first
contribution is a reflection on legal approaches to automation in the
United States; the Article identifies an existing and ill-conceived
approach to governing automation that focuses on the capabilities of
the day's automation. The second contribution is a legal approach to
emerging technologies that recognizes the complex relationship
between man and machine: policy knots. Using the policy knot
approach, this Article includes a preliminary series of Fair
Automation Practices Principles based on existing automation design
principles, missing guidance, and recently identified issues.
25. Steven J. Jackson, Tarleton Gillespie & Sandy Payette, The Policy Knot:
Re-integrating Policy, Practice and Design in CSCW Studies of Social Computing, in Proceedings
of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing
(2014); infra, Section V.
26. ILLAH REZA NOURBAKHSH, Robot Futures 117 (2013).
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II. AUTOMATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE
By focusing on man-machine systems, the category of emerging
technology covered in this Article is exceptionally broad,
encompassing the many automated tools used in everyday life as well
as those sophisticated, networked, and "intelligent" technologies and
spaces on the horizon. The subject matter is narrow enough to
exclude three of the other GRINN 27 technology categories: genetic
engineering, neuroscience, and nanotechnology.
Broadly, automation includes all the ways computers and
machines help people perform tasks more quickly, accurately, and
efficiently. The term "automation" refers to: (1) the mechanization
and integration of the sensing of environmental variables through
artificial sensors, (2) data processing and decision making by
computers, and (3) mechanical action by devices that apply forces on
the environment or information action through communication to
people of information processed.2 The term encompasses open-loop
operations29 and closed-loop control,30 as well as intelligent systems.31
Leading automation designer Thomas Sheridan explains the
transition across these concepts:
Computers have continued to become smaller, faster, more powerful and cheaper.
Automation has moved from open-loop mechanization of the industrial revolution, then
to simple closed-loop linear control, then to non-linear and adaptive control, and
recently to a mix of crisp and fuzzy rule-based decision, neural nets and genetic
algorithms and other mechanisms that truly recognize patterns and learn.
3 2
Older automation was not mobile, held minimal
purpose-specific sensors, and operated with limited processing power,
but ubiquitous computing means ubiquitous automation of many
functions of many tasks.33 Harvard business professor James R.
Bright was correct in 1958 when he said:
27. GRINN is an acronym used to refer to genetic engineering, robotics, information
technology, neuroscience, and nanotechnology.
28. THOMAS B. SHERIDAN, HUMANS AND AUTOMATION: SYSTEM DESIGN AND RESEARCH
ISSUES 9-10 (2002).
29. Open loop controls have no measurement of system output or feedback.
30. In a closed loop control system, the output is monitored and fed back to a control to
make adjustments.
31. Intelligent systems can be defined as autonomous systems with intelligence or
achieving intelligent behavior through computation. ROBERT J. SCHALKOFF, INTELLIGENT
SYSTEMS: PRINCIPLES, PARADIGMS, AND PRAGMATICS 1 (2009).
32. Thomas B. Sheridan, Function Allocation: Algorithm, Alchemy or Apostasy?, 52
INT'L J. HUMAN-COMPUT. STUDIES 203, 205 (2000).
33. Raja Parasuraman and Christopher D. Wickens, Humans: Still Vital After All These
Years of Automation, 50 HUMAN FACTORS 511, 511-12 (2008).
[Vol. 18:1:77
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[Automation] has been used as a technological rallying cry, a manufacturing goal, an
engineering challenge, an advertising slogan, a labor campaign banner, and as the
symbol of ominous technological progress.... Automation simply means something
significantly more automatic than previously existed in that plan, industry, or
location. 34
Although automation is continual, the nature of automation
today, from its ubiquity to its intelligence to its import, has taken on a
new set of characteristics worthy of evaluation and reflection.
Automation is never really old or new but is getting another close look
in light of new technological advances. Nicholas Carr has recently
written a book dedicated to the subject of automation-"about he use
of computers and software to do things we used to do ourselves.'35
Today's automation is characterized by data collected through sensors
and ever-advancing algorithms processing that data. This
development has a powerful impact on the world. Digital automation
has crept into every facet of life. We have automated decisions about
whether to delete emails, who to date, who to hire, what movies to
watch, what search terms to enter, what to eat, where to drive, where
to shop, when to sleep, when to send birthday greetings, and how to go
through our days.3 6 It is not just seemingly mundane daily tasks that
we have augmented with computational support. Human resources
departments, government agencies, school districts, parole boards,
and Medicaid administrators rely on big data to make determinations
about individuals and resources. Digital automation tells us what is
important and whether we are important.
Digital automation utilizes elegant algorithms to process piles
and piles of data to some end. The algorithm itself has recently come
under scrutiny as a powerful force that can dictate interests and
actions. As part of a conference entitled "Governing Algorithms" held
at New York University in 2013, Tarleton Gillespie defined algorithms
as "encoded procedures for transforming input data into a desired
output, based on specified calculations.37  Gillespie argued that
algorithms produce and certify knowledge in a world of ubiquitous
computing. Frank Pasquale's book The Black Box Society details the
way in which these deliberately concealed mathematical processes
shape our reputations, knowledge inquiries, and financial existence.
34. NICHOLAS CARR, THE GLASS CAGE: AUTOMATION AND US 3435 (2014) (CITING JAMES
R. BRIGHT, AUTOMATION AND MANAGEMENT 4-5 (1958)).
35. Id. at 1.
36. Id.; see e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 34-35 (2015); see also CHRISTOPHER STEINER,
AUTOMATE THIS (2012).
37. Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES (Tarleton
Gillespie, Pablo Boczkowski & Kirsten Foot eds., 2014), http://governingalgorithms.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/1-paper- gillespie.pdf [http://perma.cc/4UIDK-77G9].
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For example, job candidates are coded and scored based on everything
from their application materials to their online networks.38 Once
hired, emails are monitored for insights into productivity and
teamwork; even smiles can be "datafied" and digitized for algorithmic
purposes.39 Google's algorithms have revolutionized inquiry in the
twenty-first century. It is Google's algorithms (which represent the
new "Coke recipe" of trade secret examples)40 that initially gave the
company so much value. A Google search gives an inquirer results not
only based on how the words she entered match words in particular
webpage content but also on who she is relative to who others are,
where she has been, and where she will be. Banks have always used
numbers and prediction to make financial decisions, but every aspect
of banking today is automated. Paychecks are automatically
deposited, accounts are monitored for fraud, credit is extended without
speaking to anyone, and investments move in less than seconds. The
algorithm is a vital piece (but only a piece) of the digital automation
process. In fact, much of big data progress has been made possible
due to big algorithms.41
Professionals are incorporating digital automation to make
work more efficient and precise. Pilots are the reference of choice, the
implementation of autopilot coming under fire whenever planes
crash.42 Doctors have been the focus a similar conversation in light of
expert systems like IBM's Watson (now being used to diagnose and
38. Pasquale, supra note 36, at 34.
39. Id.
40. See Bruce Horovitz, "Buzz Surrounds Relocation of Coke's Secret Formula," USA
Today (Dec. 8, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/moneylindustriesfood/storyl2011-12-
08/secret-formulas-as-pr/51751328/1 [http://perma.cc/PAM2-TZ5Z]; National Institute of
Standards and Technology, Trade Secrets Protection in the U.S.,
http://www.nist.gov/mep/upload/marinaslides.pdf [http://perma.cc/5S7M-A32Q] (Coke recipe and
Google's PageRank included on the "Examples of Trade Secrets" slide).
41. Jonathan Shaw, Why 'Big Data' is a Big Deal, HARV. MAG. (Mar.-Apr. 2014),
http://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/why-big-data-is-a-big-deal [http://perma.cc/63HK-VUFW].
42. Final Air France Crash Report says Pilots Failed to React Swiftly, CNN (July 5,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/05/world/europe/france- air-crash-report [http://perma.cc
P4H5-RCTT]; 'Ghost Flight' Horror Crash Blamed on Pilots, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 10, 2006),
http://www.dailymail.co.uknews/article-409703/Ghost-flight-horror-crash-blamed-pilots.html
[http://perma.cc/C3F9-XRD9];Jacob Kastrenakes, Asiana Airlines Crash in San Francisco
Blamed on Overuse of Autopilot, THE VERGE (June 24, 2014),
http://www.theverge.comJ2014/6/24/5838072/asiana-airlines-flight.214-crash-autopilot-issues-at-
fault-ntsb-finds [http://perma.cc/83QE-DSYP; Calum MacLeod, Authorities: Flight 370 on




THE IRONIES OF AUTOMATION LAW
treat patients)43 and surgery robots like da Vinci. 44 Other professions
that have high risks, albeit not life-threatening risks, and recently
incorporated significant amounts of digital automation include
lawyers and traders. High frequency trading has reshaped Wall
Street, transforming the skills and know-how of stock traders.45 As
one analyst bluntly explained, "All [traders] do today is hit buttons on
computer screens.'"46 Legal practice has long been digitized,
dominated by the WestLaw and LexisNexis legal databases, but the
practice of law has recently gotten "smarter." E-discovery software
performs critical document review in search of evidence, synthesizes
material, and details connections between events and people. Lex
Machina and other software developments that predict outcomes and
strategies for specific cases47 may soon present the courtroom
equivalent of Deep Blue.
48
Streets and airspaces are full of automated systems as well and
will soon hold more automated systems-both in quantity and quality.
Drones were a hot Christmas gift in 2014-so much so that the FAA
issued a statement asking recipients to fly with care.49 Already in use
by law enforcement, these increasingly flyer-friendly devices will soon
be taking to the air to deliver packages and capture news, as well as to
monitor everything from crowds to crops. As drones are paced to take
the air, self-driving vehicles are poised to take the streets. Even
moving by foot or public transportation has been transformed by
personal devices carried in our pockets and networked buses, trains,
and ferries. Finding and moving ourselves around the world
43. Jonathan Cohn, The Robot Will See You Now, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/03/the-robot-will-see-you-now/3092 161
[http://perma.cc/FH9M-U4B6].
44. Roni Caryn Rabin, New Concerns on Robotic Surgeries, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/new-concerns-on-robotic-surgeries/ [http://perma.cc/
ZXE2-ZSHH].
45. CARR, supra note 34, at 115-16.
46. CARR, supra note 34, at 115 (citing Max Raskin and Ilan Kolet, Wall Street Jobs
Plunge as Profits Soar, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 23, 2013, 11:01 PM),
http-//www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-24/wall-street-jobs-plunge-as-profits-soar-chart-of-the-
day.html [http://perma.cc/ZKA5-G3ZM].
47. Id. at 116.
48. Legendary chess player Garry Kasparov played IBM chess program Deep Blue in a
set of high profile challenges, famously winning the first and losing the second. Rich McCormick,
How a Computer Error Helped Deep Blue Beat Humanity's Best Chess Player, THE VERGE, (Oct.
24, 2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/10/24/7056493/how-a-computer-error-helped-deep-blue-
beat-humanitys-best-chess-player [http://perma.cc/2SQ4-KB5N].
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efficiently is possible anytime and anywhere thanks to digital
automation.
III. IRONIES OF AUTOMATION
There are downsides to automation that we choose to endure
because of the perceived benefits. There are also unintended
consequences that were not foreseen or considered when the
automation was engineered. And even when automation is intended
to make a specific thing better, it can make that very thing worse.
Before delving into legal treatment of automation, it is important to
understand not only the definition of and potential for automation, but
also its complex man-machine nature-the nature that leads to
ironies. A number of engineers, scholars, and commentators have
made strides in uncovering this nature and are highlighted in this
Section.
A. The Dark Side of Automation
"If computers' abilities are expanding so quickly and if people,
by comparison, seem slow, clumsy, and error-prone, why not build
immaculately self-contained systems that perform flawlessly without
any human oversight or intervention?"50  The short answer is that
automation can be flawed, break, and have widespread detrimental
effects. There are downsides to supplementing tasks and processes
with mechanical or computational automation. Carr's book details a
number of studies on the impact of automation, many of which
conclude "sharp tools, dull minds."51  Shifting mental and physical
tasks, memory, and analysis has been the practice of humans since
writing on cave walls, but our brains, bodies, and expectations are
altered by the shift. Does anyone know how to Shepardize52 a case in
print anymore? When was the last time you drove a manual
transmission car? These tasks were always supported by automation
to some extent, but it is important to recognize that relying on
automation can make us less capable generally.
50. Nicholas Carr, All Can be Lost: The Risk of Putting Our Knowledge in the Hands of
Machines, THE ATLANTIC, (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2013/1 1/the-great-forgetting/309516/ [http://perma.cc/9REE-H7QF].
51. CARR, supra note 34, at 78 (citing Vivek Halder, Sharp Tools, Dull Minds, THIS IS
THE BLOG OF VIVEK HALDAR, http:/Iblog.vivekhaldar.com/post/66660163006/sharp-tools-dull-
minds [http://perma.cc/CN5T-TZL5]).
52. "Shepardize" refers to the process of consulting Shepard's Citation Service to see if a
case has been overturned, reaffirmed, questioned, or cited by later cases. Shepard's Citations
Service, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/shepards. page [http://perma.cc/
4FFZ-G5Z2].
[Vol. 18:1:77
THE IRONIES OF AUTOMATION LAW
Reliance on automation may have a general dulling effect on
our minds and bodies, but automation can also have significant and
inherent flaws, producing more immediate and significant harms. In
his book To Forgive Design, Henry Petroski explains that technologies
break because innovations are commissioned, funded, designed, built,
and maintained by humans and that we overestimate the reliability
and capabilities of technology.
5 3
We humans first conceive of and design even the most autonomous systems, and we
inadvertently invest our human limitations in them.... [Tihose people whom we call
inventors, designers, and engineers set out to achieve what they perceive to be a good
end and to do it with as much care and dedication as they are capable of mustering. The
creators, maintainers, and operators of technology are by and large capable and
committed individuals and teams who above all else want their creations and plans and
charges to succeed. That they sometimes fail is but testimony to the humanness of the
people involved.
54
In her 2008 article Technological Due Process, Danielle Citron
outlined the problems in converting government policy to code and
automating agency decisions like distributing welfare benefits or
excluding individuals from air travel.55 The programmers' bias was
represented in a Colorado public benefit system that required workers
to enter whether a potential welfare recipient was a "beggar" and the
federal Parent Locator Service that identified individuals as "dead-
beat" parents.56 Even something as seemingly neutral as maps and
location are fraught with subjectivity and choices-and always have
been. Maps play a large role in how we understand the world, but
maps have always been about power, plagued with mistakes, and the
product of human choices.57 In spite of this subjectivity and lack of
reliability, we may rely on digital automation using GPS to get us
where we need to go effectively and efficiently, even when it sends us
into lakes58 or off-road.59 As with all technological innovation, we
must be both thoughtful about our choices to utilize automation and
aware of its limitations.
53. See generally HENRY PETROSKI, To FORGIVE DESIGN (2012).
54. Id. at 23-24.
55. See Danielle Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1252
(2008).
56. See id. at 1257, 1280.
57. Aleks Krotoski, Digital Humans: Maps, BBC RADIO 4 (Nov. 10, 2014),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmeslb04nrmgs [http://perma.cc/89HQ-UA7Y].
58. See Jesus Diaz, Man Drowns After GPS Guides Him Into a Lake, GIZMODO (Oct. 4,
2010, 7:13 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5655527/man-drowns-after-gps-guides-him-into-a-lake
[http://perma.cc/CVA5-SXTY].
59. See Casey Chan, This is What Happens When the GPS is Wrong, GIZMODO (Oct. 2,
2010, 7:00 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5654044/this-is-what-happens-when-the-gps-is-wrong
[http://perma.cc/AW93-E27W].
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B. The Human in the Loop
In 1983, Ruth Schwartz Cowan's More Work for Mother traced
the way in which technology shifted the burden of domestic labor from
men and boys to mothers and wives over the last three centuries.60
"Advances" in the industrialization of household technologies to make
domestic work processes easier did not actually, according to Cowan,
diminish the amount of work women had to perform.61 Cast iron
stoves liberated men from having to chop wood, and municipal water
meant men did not have to haul water.62 Advances in technology were
made with the intent of lightening the load of housework, but
domestic tasks were left entirely to women, whose workload was
changed, but not lightened. Edward Tenner collected and synthesized
innovations like those reflected upon by Cowan-innovations that
created what he calls revenge effects, those with unforeseen and
unpleasant consequences.63 Instead of solving problems, or in addition
to solving them, problems are often simply spread out in space and
time, creating chronic issues.64  For example, carelessness and
accidents are more common due to new safety devices, and tougher
insects and diseases came about from better pesticides.6 5 A relevant
chapter of Tenner's work includes his claim that our computational
improvements, meant to significantly reduce the strain of physical and
mental tasks, are complex and actually require a great deal of
vigilance.66 This is because our technologies are so often complex,
imperfect, and frequently break. We have to remember to save files
on numerous devices in various places and replace batteries in smoke
detectors. Overlooking the "humanness" of the human in the loop
rarely serves that human well.
In 1983, Bainbridge succinctly described the ironies of
automation. The automation designer, a human, automates what she
can under the theory that the human is unreliable and inefficient.67
This is the first irony, of course, because as a human, the designer is
unreliable and inefficient. She delegates the easy tasks of the
automation operator, a human, to an automated process, making the
60. See generally RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, MORE WORK FOR MOTHER: THE IRONIES OF
HOUSEHOLD TECHNOLOGY FROM THE OPEN HEARTH TO THE MICROWAVE (1985).
61. See id. at 12.
62. See id.





67. Lisanne Bainbridge, Ironies of Automation, 19:6 AUTOMATICA 775 (1983).
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difficult aspects more difficult. The human in the loop is left with
hard and unpleasant tasks, those that could not be automated, and
automation errors and failures. The second irony is then that the
automation designer intends to make the life of the operator easier
and better, but by focusing on automation capabilities, the designer
makes the operator's life more difficult.
These ironies result from relegating the human to a monitor
and a safeguard, a responsibility that even the most motivated human
will have problems maintaining vigilance toward. Rare, abnormal
conditions are difficult to detect when inappropriate deference and
trust of the machine (automation bias)68 builds in human operators
interacting with a well-functioning system. Additionally, a decline in
the perception of environmental elements and system functioning
(situational awareness)69 occurs in the operator. When inevitable
errors occur, the operator's inappropriate reliance upon the
automation (complacency)70  and lack of sharp skills (skill
degradation)71 result in a decreased ability to perform when needed.
These human-automation interaction concepts are discussed in
greater detail below, but the true irony is that the most successful
automation systems-those that fail and cause need for manual
intervention on the rarest occasions-require the greatest investment
in operator training. In short, the more advanced and reliable the
automation, the more important the human operator must be.
Our quest for more, better, and faster should also be adaptive,
diverse, and reflective, according to Tenner, who argues that we must
recognize revenge effects and act on them early.72 Petroski echoes this
sentiment, explaining: "Successful change comes not from emulating
success and trying to better it, but from learning from and
anticipating failure, whether actually experienced or hypothetically
imagined.'73 The next Section analyzes the way in which law may or
may not support recognition of these larger social goals and the
human in the loop.
68. Kathleen L. Mosier, Linda J. Skitka, Susan Heers, & Mark Burdick, Automation
Bias: Decision Making and Performance in High-Tech Cockpits, 8:1 INT'L. J. AVIATION
PSYCHOLOGY 47, 47 (1998); infra Section V.C.
69. Mica R. Endsley, Automation and Situation Awareness, in Automation and Human
Performance: Theory and Application 163, 163-65 (Raja Parasuraman & Mustapha Mouloua,
eds., 1996); infra Section V.C.
70. Raja Parasurman, Robert Molloy, & Indramani L. Singh, Performance Consequences
of Automation-Induced "Complacency," 3:1 INT'L. J. AVIATION PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1993); infra
Section V.C.
71. Earl L.Wiener & Renwick E. Curry, Plight-Deck Automation: Promises and
Problems, 23:10 ERGONOMICS 995 (1980).
72. Tenner, supra note 63, at 8, 107.
73. Petroski, supra note 53, at 329.
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IV. THE IRONY OF AUTOMATION LAW
This Article examines automation in particular because it
covers an array of sociotechnical systems that are both old and broad
enough to gain insight from the past. Most importantly, it is not
possible to look back on prior robot or artificial intelligence law, but
policy approaches to automation continue to be relevant through
pressing policy efforts to manage social concerns surrounding the
datafied, algorithmic, and robotics "revolutions." In this Section, the
results of investigating five case studies are presented. They reveal
an irony of automation law, named for its resemblance to the ironies of
automation.
The case studies below are old enough to give some sense of the
effectiveness of the law. Accordingly, they do not include new or
proposed automation regulation (such as those applicable to domestic
commercial drones or automated trading in financial markets) but are
intended to inform current and future regulatory debates. Each
involves an overwhelmingly complex area of law, social context, and
technological innovation and is only touched upon briefly. While the
chosen cases may not reflect a general policy trend toward
automation, the cases do reveal an approach to automation that
should be avoided: an automation-centered approach. Following the
extraction of this approach from the different examples is a discussion
of reasons that lead to the flawed outcomes from an
automation-centered approach and a proposal for a more suitable,
sociotechnical policy approach to automation.
A. Out of the Loop
When accidents happen or bias or abuse occurs, a mechanical
fix is a tempting solution. Removing the human, this line of thinking
goes, will remove the subjectivity, the errors, the inexactness, and the
carelessness. This result is neither possible nor desirable and
approaches automation as if it has had no negative consequences.
1. Legislating Railroad Safety
While developments in robotics are certainly driving regulatory
conversations, Congress was regulating automated mechanisms as far
back as 1893. In that year, Congress passed the Safety Appliance Act,
which required railroads to place automatic couplers on all freight
cars over a period of five years.74 Implemented in 1904, the Act was
74. See Safety Appliance Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 531 (repealed 1994).
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intended to reduce the staggering injuries and deaths suffered by
railroad workers. In 1894, one in 428 employees was killed, and one
in thirty-three was injured, totaling 25,245 employees killed or
injured. After compliance with the automatic couplers and brakes was
established, one in 357 employees died, and one in nineteen was
injured.75  The increase was a dramatic blow to those that felt
railways represented an important progress for the United States and
that safety could be achieved for this innovation. Policymakers saw
humans being injured by a task that could be automated; therefore,
they automated it. However, they failed to recognize how humans
were interacting with the cars and each other to achieve objectives
and would need to do so with the automated additions.
The Accident Reports Act was passed by President Taft in 1910
to better evaluate the effectiveness of railway safety measures.
76
Additional issues, including the identification of safety hazards and
defects, were addressed in the Safety Appliance Act of 1910, which
required standards for equipment, practices, and inspection.77 Safety
First programs were then initiated by Chicago and North Western
Railway in 1910.78 By 1918, all Class I railroads were required by
legislation to adopt similar programs.79 Statistics in employee injuries
and fatalities began to improve after the initial increase, dropping by
75 percent from 1920 to 1940.80 After a more comprehensive approach
was adopted to address railroad employee safety and companies
started taking an active role in decreasing injuries, the human in the
loop became a pivotal part of the regulatory equation.
2. Adjudicating Warrantless Searches
Other laws, regulations, and rights that do not mention
automation explicitly are interpreted as regulating the human in the
loop by the judicial system. Whether a human is required to observe
or receive information disclosed by an individual so that the individual
loses her expectation of privacy (and associated rights) is an important
aspect in debates surrounding Fourth Amendment privacy rights.
8 1
75. S. W. Usselman, The Lure of Technology and the Appeal of Order: Railroad Safety
Regulation in Nineteenth Century America, 21 Bus. & ECON. HISTORY 290 (1992).
76. See Accident Reports Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 62-165 (1910) (codified as 49 U.S.C. §§
20901-03 (2015)).
77. See Safety Appliance Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 298 (repealed 1994).
78. IAN SAVAGE, THE ECONOMICS OF RAILROAD SAFETY 23 (1998).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Kevin S. Bankston & Arnie Stephanovich, When Robot Eyes Are Watching
You: The Law & Policy of Automated Communications Surveillance, 2014 WE ROBOT CONF.,
http://robots.law.miami.edu/2014/wp-
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No "search" by government agents necessarily occurs until
information is exposed to a human being. In other words, a human is
required to be in the loop for a search to have been performed,
meaning a machine alone cannot violate one's right to privacy.8 2 In
United States v. Karo, the Court explained that a defendant's
acceptance of a container with a hidden homing beacon did not invade
his privacy, but the monitoring of the information by the agents later
was an invasion.8 3 The Court explained:
[W]e have never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute
searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. A holding to that effect would mean
that a policeman walking down the street carrying a parabolic microphone capable of
picking up conversations in nearby homes would be engaging in a search even if the
microphone were not turned on. It is the exploitation of technological advances that
implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence.
8 4
Additionally, the Supreme Court held in Kyllo v. United States
that the use of thermal imaging to detect infrared heat waves was a
search, not because the Fourth Amendment extended protection to
heat waves outside a home, but because the use of thermal imaging
technology allowed human agents to infer activities within the home.85
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the line is drawn
between man and machine: the machine is relied upon as less invasive
and protecting dignity-the opposite determination established for
robocalls, as discussed below. By focusing on the capabilities of a fully
automated information system in the 1980s, the Court determined
that a human must be in the loop for a reasonable expectation of
privacy to be invaded, but today's rampant, fully-automated data
collection schemes have left citizens vulnerable to incredibly granular,
widespread, and systematic invasions. In June 2013, a National
Security Agency (NSA) program called PRISM was brought to the
public's attention revealing the government collection of metadata
content/uploads/2014/07/BankstonStepanovich WeRobot.pdf [http://perma.cc/FTW8-5LD5]; see
Orin Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1005, 1009-12, 1032-38 (2010); Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizure in a Digital World, 119
HARv. L. REV. 531 (2005); Matthew J. Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA
L. REV. 581 (2011).
82. See Kerr, Searches and Seizure in a Digital World, supra note 81, at 554; Note, Data
Mining, Dog Sniffs, and the Fourth Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 691 (2014); see also Florida v.
Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1058 (2013); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); Jay Stanley, Computers vs. Humans: What Constitutes A Privacy
Invasion? ACLU (July 2, 2012), https://www.aclu.orglblog/computers-vs-humans-what-
constitutes- privacy-invasion [http://perma.cc/AK37-RYJQ].
83. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984).
84. Id.
85. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001).
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through companies like Verizon, Google, and Facebook.6 Ruling that
the bulk collection of American telephone metadata is
unconstitutional, Judge Leon, writing for the US District Court for the
District of Columbia, characterized the "collect now and query later"
form of surveillance in the following way:
I cannot imagine a more "indiscriminate" and "arbitrary" invasion than this systematic
and high-tech collection and retention of personal data on virtually every single citizen
for purposes of querying and analyzing it without prior judicial approval.... Surely,
qilrh nrnarnm infringes on "that degree of privacy" that the founders enshrined in the
Fourth Amendment.
87
There are a number of legal issues related to the PRISM
program, including the treatment of foreign versus domestic
communications and the difference between pen registers and
metadata, but the distinction between man and machine searches in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has certainly played a role in the
development of such programs. In fact, the NSA defines the
"acquisition" of information for the purposes of a wiretap interception
(a violation of the federal wiretapping statute) as, "the collection by
NSA or the FBI through electronic means of a non-public
communication to which it is not an intended party.88 But the agency
defines "collection" as information that "has been received for use by
an employee of a Department of Defense intelligence component in the
course of his official duties.... [D]ata acquired by electronic means is
'collected' only when it has been processed into intelligible form. '8 9 In
other words, the NSA is operating under the assumption that the
collection and processing of communications is not an issue until a
human has it in human-readable format.
It is still unclear whether a machine "alone" can invade one's
privacy; this line of inquiry has not been settled, and a number of
decisions and commentaries point in various directions. For instance,
Kevin Bankston and Amie Stepanovich argue that requiring a human
to perform specific tasks that trigger Fourth Amendment issues is
both unsupported by (some) case law and leads to far, far less privacy
86. Steven Nelson, Nine Companies Tied to PRISM, Obama Will be Smacked With
Class-Action Lawsuit Wednesday, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.: NEWSGRAM (June 11, 2013, 6:23
PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-
obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday Uhttp://perma.ccD454-5Z38].
87. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 42 (D.D.C. 2013) vacated and remanded, No
14-5004, 2015 WL 5058403 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 2015).
88. NAT'L SEC. AGENCY, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NAT'L SEC. AGENCY IN
CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION
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protection.90 They, however, are in the minority. Richard Posner has
argued that only a human can raise constitutional privacy issues.91
Similarly, Bruce Boyden argues that no "interception" occurs under
the Fourth Amendment without human review,92 and Matthew
Tokson argues that automation "alone" cannot violate the Fourth
Amendment.93 By ignoring the man-machine nature of technology,
interpretations of laws intended to protect against government
invasions of privacy have unintentionally encouraged automated
systems to keep the human far from the loop and to operate outside
black boxes, which has allowed for widespread automated surveillance
and will later be considered as poor design.
3. State Enforcement for Traffic Safety
While states pass laws and produce judicial opinions related to
automation, recent controversies surrounding red light cameras have
drawn attention to the use of automated enforcement of traffic
violations and the laws that authorize this enforcement. There is wide
variation among states. For instance, a number of states allow for
statewide use of automated enforcement without an officer present
(almost all have slightly lower penalties for violations enforced
through automation than traditional methods).94 On the other hand,
photo enforcement is prohibited in a number of states, including
Nevada, which only allows for the use of the imaging equipment when
it is in the hands of an officer or installed in a law enforcement vehicle
or facility.95 Traffic laws are intended to promote safety. Speed limits
prohibit drivers from legally driving at speeds known to significantly
increase accident numbers and severity. Red lights organize drivers
in high traffic zones to prevent collisions. In theory, the enforcement
of both of these functions could be fully automated, but prohibiting the
use of automated enforcement is as popular as installation.96 The
90. See Bankston & Stephanovich, supra note 81.
91. See Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and the Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245,
254 (2008).
92. See Bruce E. Boyden, Can a Computer Intercept Your Email?, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
669, 673 (2012).
93. See Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581,
613 (2011).
94. See Speed and Red Light Camera Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASSOCIATION
(Oct. 2015), http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfoflaws/autoenforce.html [http://perma.cc/MCE9-
8R3D].
95. Id.
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problem is that while cameras reduce red-light running violations,
they do not necessarily make intersections safer. In fact, there is
mounting evidence that red light cameras have made many
intersections more dangerous because human drivers brake differently
at these intersections resulting in more rear collisions.97 Additionally,
while automation of enforcement is intended to be accurate, equal,
consistent, and particularly suitable for determinable legal
conclusions like traffic violations, the Do Robots Dream of Electric
Laws? An Experiment in the Law as Algorithm project presented at
We Robot 2013 reveals significant variation in the number and types
of citations issued.98 We must be critical of technology, especially
when introduced to enforce laws, and be aware of the ever-present
human in the loop.
B. In the Loop
Other times, machines appear to be the source of the problem.
In order to quickly deal with the issue, the law has simply banned the
lack of a human or required their involvement. Neither approach
effectively solves the problem or protects the stated interests.
1. Regulating Invasive Robocalls
Congress has amended the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA) twice, and the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) has
made numerous changes to implementing the law since it passed in
1991.99 In the late 1980s, robocalls came under regulatory scrutiny
because the automation was considered more invasive than human
callers because the rate at which the robocalls could invade the
home-and later the pockets and purses of individuals-was much
more efficient.100  An initial spike in complaints prompted the
National Do Not Call Registry maintained by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), which makes no distinction between human and
97. Carl Bialik, Seeing Red, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2013),
http:/blogs.wsj.com/numbers/seeing-red- 1208/ [http://perma.cc/6J5J-554S].
98. Lisa Shay, Woodrow Hartzog, John Nelson & Gregory Contri, Do Robots Dream of




99. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).
100. S. W. Waller, D. Heidtke & J. Stewart, The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991: Adapting Consumer Protection to Changing Technology (Loy. U. Chi. Sch. of Law, Research
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automated calls and today has more than 221 million numbers on it.101
The FCC responded with regulations that prohibit autodialing02 and
artificial or prerecorded messages except in limited circumstances and
now require prior express written consent before telemarketing
companies may use either technology to reach customers.03 An
interesting distinction remains for political calls, which are outside
the FTC's purview: there are no restrictions on manually dialed
political calls to landlines or cell phones, but robocalls (autodialed
calls or artificial voice messages) to mobile numbers are prohibited
without prior express consent. 04
Judge Easterbrook explained the justification for regulatory
variation between human and robot callers: "A human being who
called [a] Cell Number would realize that [the] Customer was no
longer the subscriber. But predictive dialers lack human intelligence
and, like the buckets enchanted by the Sorcerer's Apprentice, continue
until stopped by their true master."10 5  The problem is that calls
continue to come in when they are unwanted, not that they are a
human or artificial voice. Telemarketing robots have become almost
indistinguishable from human callers,106 and reaching voters with
automated support or fully automated systems is one way that
candidates with smaller bank accounts can promote their message and
candidacy.107 By creating this distinction instead of enforcing
recipient choice, regulators limit the benefits of political calls without
protecting citizens from unwanted privacy invasions.
2. Right to Fair Decision Making in Europe
Europeans have managed to maintain a legal distance from
high levels of automation, though the effectiveness of requiring a
101. The Do Not Call Registry, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/media-resources/do-not-call-registry [http://perma.cc/CH6K-4SAS].
102. Autodialing is defined as "equipment which has the capacity to store or produce
telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator and to dial such
numbers." The FCC has emphasized that this covers equipment that has the "capacity to dial
numbers without human intervention whether or not the numbers called actually are randomly
or sequentially generated or come from calling lists." U.S. Fed. Comm. Comm'n, Enforcement
Advisory No. 2012-06 (Sept. 11, 2012), https://www.fcc.gov/document/political-campaigns-
restrictions-autodialed-prerecorded-calls [https://perma.cc/2BF8-95JF].
103. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.
104. U.S. Fed. Comm. Comm'n, supra note 102.
105. Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co. LLC, 679 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2012).
106. George Dvorsky, Robots So Realistic They Can Deny They're Bots, DISCOVERY NEWS
(Dec. 12, 2013) http://news.discovery.contechlrobotics/robots-so-realistic-they-can-deny-theyre-
bots-131212.htm [http://perma.cc/524Y-UCSY].
107. Jason C. Miller, Regulating Robocalls: Are Automated Calls the Sound of, or a
Threat to, Democracy?, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 213, 215 (2009).
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human in the loop to meet certain social goals is questionable. The
European Data Protection Directive of 1995 includes the right of every
person "not to be subject to a decision which produces legal effects
concerning him or significantly affects him or her and which is based
solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain
personal aspects related to him, such as his performance at work,
creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc."108 Significantly weakened
by exceptions, the essence of the right ensures that individuals have a
right to a human in the loop for any decision that produces legal or
significant effects. Leaving open the option for an individual to go
outside the automated system that processes everyone else prevents
the equalizing purpose of such systems and allows for beneficial
treatment to be granted to those who have historically received it.
The right is certainly less disruptive than an all-out ban on automated
decision making, but it still has done little to protect against the
different types of bias or errors that derive from both humans and
automation.
Many of the concerns about automated decision making have
since been incorporated into regulations related to the expansive
concept of "profiling," defined as "any form of automated processing
intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to [a] natural
person or to analyse or predict in particular that natural person's
performance at work, economic situation, location, health, personal
preferences, reliability, or behaviour"109 in the Data Protection
Regulation, which is set to update the Data Protection Directive. For
instance, the main provision in the Regulation is in Article 20.110 It
was previously entitled "Measures based on profiling," which suggests
that it refers to decision making based on profiles, but the title was
changed to "Profiling" by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice,
and Home Affairs (LIBE) through its amendments."n The method of
utilizing a human to protect against harms caused by automation was
108. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Oct. 1995
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, art. 15(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281), 31 et. seq.
109. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individual with Regard toe the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, at Art. 4(3a), COM (2012) 11 (Oct. 7, 2013)
http:l/www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/20092014/documents/libe/dv/comp-am-art 0129/
compam art 01-29en.pdf [http://perma.cc/WYU9-UBP5] [hereinafter LIBE Committee] (the
compromise amendments on Arts. 1-29).
110. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data (Data Protection Regulation) at Art. 20, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25,
2012).
111. LIBE Committee, supra note 109, at Art. 20.
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reinforced through the LIBE amendments, which retained the
following language: "In any case, such processing should be subject to
suitable safeguards, including specific information of the data subject
and the right to obtain human assessment (previously human
intervention) and that such measure should not concern a child."112
When the government required automatic coupling to protect
railroad workers, it ignored the way humans interact with the
automation, resulting in even more deaths and injuries. Robocalls are
heavily regulated by the FCC, but today's automated telemarketers
are sophisticated to a level that offers the same recipient action as a
human with less invasive treatment. Courts have determined that a
machine cannot violate privacy. However, automated tracking,
surveillance, and processing reveals more about us today to more
organizations than any human could possibly discover. States have
automated enforcement of traffic violations in order to improve safety
statistics without considering the way in which humans would
interact with the technology, resulting in more accidents.113 Bans on
automated decision making in Europe have protected against neither
human nor machine error. Referring to problems with the regulation
of big data analytics, Cynthia Dwork and Deirdre Mulligan explain:
"Viewing the problem as one of machine versus man misses the point.
The key lies in thinking about how best to manage the risks to the
values at stake in a sociotechnical system."11 4
V. POLICY KNOTS
This Article is not intended to provide specific regulatory
proposals or judicial frameworks but to assess legal approaches
broadly and suggest ways in which the law may better account for the
man-machine nature of automation and support optimized man and
machine systems that meet the goals of law. While relying on the
false distinction between man and machine is not an effective
governance approach, one that recognizes the interdependence within
the automated system will still need to offer constraints, provide
guidance, and establish accountability. It is important to understand
how automation has changed to resolve its ironic outcomes and locate
an available position in existing practices for the law. This exercise
112. Id. at Art. 20, Recital 58.
113. For example, California permits red light cameras to issue citations to registered
owners or identifiable drives by taking images of tags and the driver. In Nevada, speed and red
light cameras are both prohibited with narrow exceptions. See Speed and Red Light Camera
Laws, supra note 94.
114. Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It's Not Privacy, And It's Not Fair, 66 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 35, 38 (2013).
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allows law to work with, not against, technological design and use
what is referred to as "policy knots" in this Section. And so, this
Section will expand on why and how utilizing existing automation
models can create an effective sociotechnical legal approach to
emerging technology.
A. Automation Policy Knots
Policy knots recognize the relationship between policy, design,
and practice without being too stringent or too lenient. Coined and
articulated by a team at Cornell University as a way of reflecting upon
certain phenomenon like Girls Around Me115 and Google Buzz,116 the
policy knot is a concept that accounts for the way emerging computing
"practices and design impact and are impacted by structures and
processes in the realm of policy."117  The policy knot concept is
informative to the governance of emerging technology, because it
highlights the importance of each element.
When any of the three elements-policy, design, and
practice- are out of balance or ignore one another, policies intended
to protect specified values are ineffective, unresolved, or ironic. This
Article argues that the policy knot can be utilized as a policy tool for
addressing emerging technologies. By actively balancing the three
elements of policy, design, and practice, more input and guidance may
be exerted while maintaining necessary flexibility in design and
accounting for technological practices.
A policy knot reinforces and complements existing
human-centered design methods for actual and safe use that recognize
the sociotechnical nature of technology. In other words, it reinforces
automation policy that is in balance with design and practice. More
than seeking to balance design processes with social concern, policy
knots are actively tied into and proactively help to shape design
processes.
115. GIRLS AROUND ME, http://girlsaround.me/ [http://perma.cc/GWY9-XWY9] (a mobile
application that shows users women nearby, using location-based mobile services, like
Foursquare, Google Maps, and GPS, and provides information on them based on available
Facebook account information).
116. Google Buzz was a social networking, microblogging, and messaging platform
launched in 2010 and discontinued in 2011. See Drew Olanoff, Reminder: Google Buzz is Still
Dead, Your Data Will be Moved to Drive, and They Thank You for Using it, TECHCRUNCH (May
25, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/05/25/reminder-google-buzz-is-still-dead-your-data-will-be-
moved-to-drive-and-they-thank-you-for-using-it/ [http://perma.cc/B9BN-VFS4].
117. Steven J. Jackson, Tarleton Gillespie & Sandy Payette, The Policy Knot:
Re-integrating Policy, Practice and Design in CSCW Studies of Social Computing, PROCEEDINGS
OF CSCW'14, Feb. 15-19, 2014, at 1.
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Turning to resolving the man-versus-machine divide in this
overlooked subset of law, the challenge for the legal field is to
somehow address the complex sociotechnical nature of automation
that is situated in practice and designed for optimal
human-automation interaction. In an early draft of his Proxity-Driven
Liability article, Bryant Walker Smith explained that human factors
intend for product use to be legal, safe, and intuitive:" 8
Tensions among the three key design targets suggest particular structural failures. A
mismatch between legality and safety implies that law as written is inefficient because
it is either too permissive or too restrictive. A mismatch between safety and actuality
suggests that users are either uninformed or irrational. And a mismatch between
actuality and legality suggests that law is either underenforced or obsolete.
1 19
The above examples are mismatches because they focus on the
capabilities of the automation, which conflicts with both safe design
and actual use, resulting in unprotected values. The task for law is to
bring legal treatment of automation in line with responsible
automation design and implementation in practice-to tie a policy
knot. There is no general legal framework for all automation-it is
introduced by government and private entities, in commercial and
public service, and across industries and communities for all kinds of
purposes. However, when the law addresses automation, based on the
above examples, focusing on the capabilities of the automation can be
counter-productive.
Just as automation-centered design leads to the ironies of
automation, legal treatment that focuses on automation has a similar
effect. This may be because the law drives the design in an
automation-centered direction even if the designer has intended a
human-centered approach. In many ways this trend suggests that the
dichotomy between man and machine is a false one, but at a
minimum, it is not reliable or stable enough to draft policy around.
Without this dichotomy, we must rethink the regulatory approach to
automation to meet stated goals and protect established values.
Command-and-control regulations that seek to produce specific
outcomes with universal rules prescribing particular conduct or
technology are often ill-suited to such complex goals.
Specific rules often cannot reflect the large number of variables involved in achieving
multifaceted regulatory goals, such as reducing the types of risk produced by a
combination of factors .... They thus direct behavior toward compliance with an
incomplete set of detailed provisions that may frustrate, rather than further, the
118. Bryant Walker Smith, Human Factors in Robotic Torts, 2013 WE ROBOT CONF.,
http://conferences.law.stanford.edu/werobot/wpcontent/uploads/sites/29/2013/04HumanFactorsR
oboticTortsBryantWalkerSmith.pdf [http://perma.cc/9CSV-NJYS].
119. Id. at 4.
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broader regulatory goal in any particular circumstance. The problem is compounded
when regulated entities are heterogeneous, and contexts are varied. 
12 0
Although less "all or nothing" than the above case studies,
requiring policymakers to regulate specific levels of autonomy for
different functions is simply not a realistic means of effective
governance. Command and control is a too "hands on" form of
governance for automation.
Automation use is context-specific and situational, and
regulation can, as the above examples suggest, frustrate, rather than
further, broad regulatory goals. Thus, it may be a good candidate for a
"more 'incomplete' regulatory instrument"121 that takes a more "hands
off' approach to regulation and simply asks for limited harms to occur
or goals to be met. But performance or goal-based regulations that
identify specific outcomes, leaving the means up to the regulatory
party, are ineffective when "desired performance is difficult to identity
in advance or assess contemporaneously"-the focus shifts from
punishment to prevention.122  Relatively recently, assessing and
preventing risk in complex spaces has been delegated based on the
understanding that the regulators are too far removed to comprehend
and effectively direct internal workings.123 The delegation to the
regulated party seeks to take advantage of the expertise and judgment
within the regulated organization to reduce complex risk by not only
mitigating the risks, but also by defining and monitoring it. 124
For a legal approach to automation that exerts external control
while leaving room for necessary flexibility and responsibility, "shared
responsibility" and institutional conditions that support enhanced
ethical decision making may serve as important governance goals.
125
Mark Coekelbergh explains that external controls in the form of
regulating engineers have come in two relevant varieties:
prescriptions which require engineers to follow codes and standards,
offering a great deal of certainty with little autonomy, and goal
setting, which offers more flexibility by encouraging the designer to
focus on risk and justification of choices but less certainty.
126
Coekelbergh suggests that this ethical responsibility may not be
desired and argues that external constraints limit the moral
120. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking,
and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 386-87 (2006).
121. Id. at 389-90.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 390.
125. Mark Coeckelbergh, Regulation or Responsibility? Autonomy, Moral Imagination,
and Engineering, 31 SC., TECH., & HUMAN VALUES 237, 245 (2006).
126. Id. at 240-41.
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imagination of engineers,127 but Shilton suggests that ethical
constraints, such as privacy, can be welcome additions to the design
process.128  While this Article calls for an approach that aligns
somewhat with a goal-setting form of governance and somewhat with
a delegation approach, it seeks nonetheless to support enhanced
ethical decision making by proposing that a set of principles
appropriately situated will offer some sense of certainty, while
preserving flexibility and establishing accountability.
B. Man versus Machine Design
Overpowering design and practice of sociotechnical systems is
likely the result of neglect of these issues on the part of policymakers.
In order to find the right complimentary role for law in the automation
policy knot, automation design and practice are detailed in the
following subsections. The treatment of human-automation system
models included here is one that has directed the field and serves as a
foundational marker. The treatment should not be considered
exhaustive nor does it include in any detail models for adaptive
autonomy, co-robotics, or scalable autonomy. An evolution of the field
is presented to show the way in which the legal approach must adapt
to new forms of design and practice.
Not only is requiring a human in or out of the loop too
simplistic a response to the threat to human values because of her
permanent role in the loop, it can also be an ineffective form of
accountability and create safety issues. Realizing that humans will
always be in the loop, a body of research has developed to understand
how the human in the loop should be accounted for to preserve or
optimize performance of the system. In 1951, the Fitts List sparked
an entire body of research focusing on function allocation-those
functions that humans should perform and those that machines (today
computers and sometimes robots) should perform.129 Fitts et al.
intended to "search for a general answer to the problem of dividing
responsibility between men and machines.130 The Fitts List is a list
of eleven statements (also called MABA-MABA: men are better at,
machines are better at) that categorize whether the man or machine
performs a function better than the other.
127. Id. at 252.
128. Katie Shilton, Value Levers: Building Ethics into Design, 38:3 SCI., TECH., & HUMAN
VALUES 374, 383-84 (2012).
129. J.C.F. de Winter & D. Dodou, Why the Fitts List has Persisted Throughout the
History of Function Allocation, 16 COGNITION, TECH. & WORK, 1 (2014).
130. Id. at 3, 6.
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Figure 1. The original Fitts List (MABA-MABA List),
1951.131
Ability to detect a small amount of visual or
acoustic energy
Ability to respond quickly to control signals and
to apply great force smoothly and
precisely
Ability to perceive patterns of light or sound Ability to perform repetitive, routine tasks
Ability to improvise and use flexible Ability to store information briefly and then to
procedures erase it completely
Ability to store very large amounts of Ability to reason deductively, including
information for long periods and to recall computational ability
relevant facts at the appropriate time
Ability to reason inductively Ability to handle highly complex
operations, i.e. to do many different things at
once
Ability to exercise judgment
Figure 2. Department of Defense adaptation, 1987.132
Detection of certain forms of very long Monitoring (both men and machines)
energy levels
Sensitivity to an extremely wide Performing routine, repetitive, or very
variety of stimuli precise operations
Perceiving patterns and making Responding very quickly to control signals
generalizations about them
Store large amounts of information for Storing and recalling large amounts of
long periods-and recall relevant facts at information in short time periods
appropriate moment
Ability to exercise judgment where events Performing complex and rapid
cannot be completely defined computation with high accuracy
Improving and adopting flexible Sensitivity to stimuli beyond the range of human
procedures sensitivity (e.g., infrared, radio waves)
Reacting to unexpected low-probability Doing many different things at the same time
events
Applying originality in closing Exerting large amounts of force smoothly and
problems precisely
131. PAUL M. Firs, HUMAN ENGINEERING FOR AN EFFECTIVE AIR NAVIGATION AND
TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM (1951).
132. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., HUMAN ENGINEERING PROCEDURES GUIDE, MIL-HDBK-763, 93
(1987).
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Profiting from experience and altering Insensitivity to extraneous factors
course of action
Performing fine manipulation, Repeating operations very rapidly,
especially where misalignment continuously, and precisely
appears unexpectedly
Continuing to perform when Operating in environments that are hostile to man
overloaded or beyond human tolerance
Reasoning inductively Deductive processes
Figure 3. Robert Gagne limitation-based adaptation, 1962.133
Functions Human Limitations Machine Limitations
Sensing Limited to certain ranges of energy Range extends far beyond human senses
display Change affecting human senses (x-rays, infrared, etc.). Seiestivity is
Sensitivity is very good excellent
Sensing Easy to reprogram Difficult to reprogram
filtering
Identifying Can be varied over relatively wide range
display of physical dimensions, Channel
capacity is small varied only in very
narrow range of physical dimensions
Channel capacity is large
Identifying Easy to reprogram Difficult to reprogram
filtering
Identifying Limits to complexity of models Potential limits of capacity are very, high
memory probably fairly high, but not precisely
known
Limits to length of sequential routines Potential limits of routines are very high
fairly high, but time consuming to
train
Interpreting Same as identifying Same as identifying
display
Interpreting Easy to reprogram. Highly flexible, that Difficult to reprogram. Relatively
filtering is, adaptable. May be reprogrammed inflexible
by self-intruction following input
changes contingent on previous
response (dynamic decision making)
Interpreting Can be readily reprogrammed to lower Difficult to reprogram
shunting levels of functioning
Interpreting Limitations to rule storage not known. Limits of rule storage are quite high.
memory Speed of reinstatement of rule Speed of using rules fairly high
sequences relatively low (as in (computing). Limited use of novel rules
computing). The use of novel rules
possible (inventing)
While consistently referenced in function-allocation research,
the Fitts List has been heavily criticized as an intrinsically flawed
descriptive list, little more than a useful starting point, insufficient,
outdated, static, and incapable of acknowledging the organizational
context and complementary nature of humans and machines.34 Like
many efforts of initial thinking on automation, the list focuses on
133. R. M. Gagne, Human Functions in Systems, in Psychological Principles in System
Development (R. M. Gagne ed., 1962).
134. Id. at 1.
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automation capabilities and could not serve as a sufficient framework
for moving forward with automation.
Around the same time, John Boyd developed a model of human
decision making to inform dogfighting tactics for military pilots:
Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA).135 Boyd discerned that the best
systems were not the best planes or the best pilots, but the best
systems that could move through the OODA model the quickest and
most effectively.136 This groundbreaking model has played a part in
the continued elite performance of U.S. pilots.
137
Figure 4. John Boyd's "Observe, Orient, Decide, Act" model
long relied upon for aviation systems.'
38
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Environment Feedback John Boyd's OODA Loop
The four stage information processing model used by Thomas
Sheridan, Raja Parasuraman, and Christopher Wickens for
automation is comparable: information acquisition, information
analysis, decision selection, and action implementation.139 Automation
of information acquisition deals with input data. It may include
135. ROBERT CORAM, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 1 (2004);
DANIEL FORD, A Vision So Noble: John Boyd, the OODA Loop, and America's War on Terror, 1
(2010); FRANS P. B. OSINGA, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, 1
(2006).
136. CORAM, supra note 135; FORD, supra note 135, at 28; OSINGA, supra note 135, at
176.
137. CORAM, supra note 135; FORD, supra note 135; OSINGA, supra note 135.
138. OSINGA, supra note 135, at 231.
139. Raja Parasuraman, Thomas B. Sheridan & Christopher D. Wickens, A Model for
Types and Levels of Human Interaction with Automation, 30:3 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYS. MAN
AND CYBERNETICS PART A: SYS. & HUMANS 286, 290 (2000).
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highlighting to bring attention to potential problem information or
filtering to bring certain information to the person's attention.140 The
information analysis phase involves the manipulation of retrieved and
processed information in working memory.1 41  Algorithms can be
applied to incoming data to produce predictions, and automated
information managers can provide context-dependent summaries of
data to human operators. The decision and action selection phase
involves decision making based on cognitive processing.142 Examples
of the decision phase include conditional logic used in expert systems
to present a decision if particular conditions exist. This phase may
require value assumptions about different possible outcomes of the
decision. At the action implementation phase, a response selection
consistent with choice is made. Automated actions may include an
agent that executes certain tasks automatically in a contextually
appropriate fashion143 (i.e., photocopiers sort, collation, stapling, and
other similar actions can have different levels of automation, leaving
certain tasks to the human). Of course, these levels are not linear;
they are coordinated and overlap into "perception-action" cycles.144
Consider the elevator, an oft-cited example of the removal of
the human from the loop.145 Elevator operators were necessary when
the automation was first introduced to ease public uncertainty about
the innovation.146 However, the human is still very much a part of the
loop. A human must press a button to initiate the process, and all
information processing and decisions are made by the human. The
automation is only of the action implementation. The elevator must
be designed with two goals: that the buttons make sense to humans
and that a human can fix the problem when an error occurs. Many of
our daily tasks have the opposite allocation. We rely on the
automation of information acquisition and analysis of weather
applications to decide whether to walk or take the bus. Our emails
are automated to highlight, filter, and organize messages to support
decisions about which information to focus and take action on.
These four stages have been overlaid with various levels of
autonomy to further model automation options. Thomas Sheridan and
140. Id. at 288, 290.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 289.
144. Id. at 289-90.
145. P.W. SINGER, Wired for War 126 (2009).
146. Id.
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William Verplank are frequently credited with pioneering the concept
of levels of autonomy which are condensed to the following: 147
Figure 5. Levels of autonomy to be applied to the four-stage
model.
148
Levels of 10. The computer decides everything, acts autonomously, ignoring the
Autonomy human.
9. The computer informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to.
8. The computer informs the human only if asked.
7. The computer executes automatically, then necessarily informs the
human.
6. The computer allows the human a restricted time to veto before
automatic execution.
5. The computer executes that suggestion if the human approves.
4. The computer suggests one alternative.
3. The computer narrows the selection down to a few.
2. The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives.
1. The computer offers no assistance; the human must take all decisions
and actions.
147. Thomas. B Sheridan and William L. Verplank, Human and Computer Control of
Undersea Teleoperators, MIT MAN-MACH. SYS. LAB REPORT 26 (1978); see THOMAS B. Sheridan,
Telerobotics, Automation & Human Supervisory Control (1992).
148. See id.
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Automation can be applied to the four classes of functions to
differing degrees:
Figure 6. Example of two systems with different levels of
automation across functions.149
Information Information Decision Action
acquisition analysis selection implementation
Automation Automation Automation Automation
level level level level






- - - - -
Low Low Low Low
Breaking processes into four phases and assigning each a level
of automation appropriate for maintaining optimal system functioning
has been vital to resolving the ironies of automation outlined by
Bainbridge.
C. Man and Machine Design
The MABA-MABA dichotomous approach continued until work
on "human-centered" design began to penetrate a number of fields in
the 1980s.150 An evaluation for automating functions to a certain level
by looking at impact on human operator performance, automation
reliability,15 1 and costs152 was in place in 2000 and has been relied
149. Parasuraman et al., supra note 139, at 289.
150. Thomas B. Sheridan, Human Centered Automation: Oxymoron or Common Sense?, 1
Sys., Man & Cybernetics 823 (1995).
151. Parasuraman et al., supra note 139, at 291.
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upon to provide general guidance. Charts like the following can help
guide responsible implementation of automation taking into account
the overall goals of the system and the humans surrounding and in
the loop.
Figure 7. Example of recommended levels for Air Traffic
Control systems after evaluation of human performance




























In relation to manual operations, if research shows that both
human and system performance are enhanced by automation at levels
of five but degrade above level seven, then the reliability and social
costs of automation should be considered within the bounds of a five-to
seven automation design. From these evaluation exercises, guidance
like the following can be drafted:
For rigid tasks that require no flexibility in decision making and with low probability of
system failure, full automation often provides the best solution. However, in systems
like those that deal with decision making in dynamic environments with many external
and changing constraints, higher levels of automation are not advisable because of the
risks and the inability of an automated decision aid to be perfectly reliable. 154
152. Id.
153. Id. at 294.
154. Mary L. Cummings, Automation and Accountability in Decision Support System
Interface Design, 32:1 J. TECH. STUDIES 23, 24 (2006).
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These types of conclusions will continue to come out of human factors
and systems engineering research, establishing expectations for
designers and implementers.
In short, automation changes the nature of the errors that
occur by reducing human error but not the probability of system error
in general. Automation leads to the deterioration of human operator
skill, which needs to be more sophisticated to deal with novel and
unique situations. Automation may increase operator workload,
complacency, and situational awareness resulting in a decline of
safety and performance. Automation reliability leads to over or under
trust of the system. Operators may commit misuse, abuse, or disuse of
an automation system due to any number of the above factors.
However, as these systems are integrated into social settings beyond
factories, flight routes, and power plants, additional factors must be
considered. These social costs are where policy can play a more active
role.
D. Man and Machine Ethics
One interesting void in the automation-design evolution is a
lack of attention paid explicitly to value-centered or value-sensitive
design. This Article includes only a small sample of the extraordinary
work that has focused on making automation safe and effective by
acknowledging the human element of these systems, but little work
has been done on integrating ethical considerations.155 That being
said, larger concerns are part of the evaluation process and a space to
add input and structure.
Ethical determinations, beyond effective performance, in
man-machine systems are a portion of the conversation that seems to
have lost steam. In 1954, Norbert Wiener expressed general
principles for the automatic future he envisioned.156 He toyed with
many ethical possibilities but was unambiguous about his feelings on
trusting machines to make critical decisions as a substitute for a
human:
155. There is a large body of work on robot ethics and moral artificial intelligence. See,
e.g., RONALD ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS (2009); PATRICK
LIN, KEITH ABNEY, & GEORGE BEKEY, Robot Ethics: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF
ROBOTICS (2011); WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS
RIGHT FROM WRONG (2010). Additionally, there is work available on ethical impacts of
automation. See, e.g., SRINIVASAN RAMAswAMY & HERMANT JOSHI, Automation Ethics, in HAND
OF AUTOMATION 809 (Shimon Y. Nof, ed., 2009); NORBERT WIENER, The Human Use of Human
Beings: Cybernetics and Society (1954); Cummings, supra note 154.
156. WIENER, supra note 155, at 16.
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[A human should] not leap in where angels fear to tread, unless he is prepared to accept
the punishment of the fallen angels. Neither will he calmly transfer to the machine
made in his own image the responsibility for his choice of good and evil, without
continuing to accept a full responsibility for that choice.
1 57
He suggested ethical principles to be coded into systems for
decision making machines, likely still expecting machines would not
decide the heaviest of decisions:
Any machine constructed for the purpose of making decisions, if it does not possess the
power of learning, will be completely literal-minded. Woe to us if we let it decide our
conduct, unless we have previously examined the laws of its action, and know fully that
its conduct will be carried out on principles acceptable to us!
1 58
However, he continues, if our machine can alter its code in such
a way that alters the ethical restraints:
On the other hand, the machine... which can learn and can make decisions on the
basis of its learning, will in no way be obliged to make such decisions as we should have
made, or will be acceptable to us. For the man who is not aware of this, to throw the
problem of his responsibility on the machine, whether it can learn or not, is to cast his
responsibility to the winds, and to find it coming back seated on the whirlwind. 159
Imagining an automatic society, Wiener argued that humans
should maintain ultimate responsibility for critical decisions, program
non-learning automation with ethical code, and realize that learning
automation will not necessarily make human-like decisions. This type
of automatic society is easier said than done, but the concepts (and
associated methods) are still not incorporated into the design process.
There is, however, a placeholder of sorts.
In a model designed by Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens,
the resulting system's impact on the operator's performance is
considered to establish initial types and levels of automation.160 Then,
risk is assessed as part of the "secondary evaluation." These are
separated into "Automation Reliability" and "Costs of Decision/Action
Outcomes."
"Although it would be nice if constructed systems functioned
well forever, they do not."161 Reliability is defined as "the probability
that an item will operate adequately for a specified period of time in
its intended application."16 2 While machine reliability and human
reliability can be analyzed and combined to predict overall
157. Id. at 184.
158. Id. at 185.
159. Id.
160. Parasuraman et al., supra note 139, at 290.
161. ROBERT W. PROCTOR & TRISHA VAN ZANDT, HUMAN FACTORS IN SIMPLE AND
COMPLEX SYSTEMS 65 (2nd ed. 2008).
162. KYUNG S. PARK, Human Reliability: Analysis, Prediction, and Prevention of Human
Errors 149 (1987).
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performance of the system,163 automation reliability will dramatically
influence the actual use of the system because of its tremendous
impact on human trust.164
Trust in automation is limited to the degree that evidence from an operator's past
experience does or doesn't provide adequate warrant for predicting how the machine will
behave in novel situations. If adequate trust and mistrust signatures for every situation
were always available, we could remedy this problem[-]but such expectations are
unrealistic. 165
Understanding trust is important to moving beyond rigid levels
of autonomy designations to adaptive autonomy and supervisory
control imitations to collaborative models,'66 but for the purposes of
understanding how a system will be assessed beyond its limited scope
(performance of the human operator-machine system), costs of action
are more relevant.
Assuming errors will occur and accounting for the reliability of
system performance, the way in which errors are managed by the
system to avoid costs-of-action outcomes will determine whether
automation levels need to be adjusted. Costs-of-action outcomes speak
directly to risk. Risk is defined generically as the costs of an error
multiplied by the probability of the errors.167  High levels of
automation are not recommended for systems where costs of errors are
dramatic, such as the loss of human life, because when errors occur in
highly automated systems, it is difficult for a human to step in to
resolve the problem.
Zero-risk impacts can still exist even with complete automation
failure, and these situations are good candidates for high-level
automation throughout the phases. High levels of automation for
decisions may also be justified when there is insufficient time for a
human operator to respond and take appropriate action or if the
human operator is not required to intervene or mange the system in
the event of automation failure. For instance, high levels of
automated decisions are set in place at nuclear power plants so that
control rods automatically drop into the core under emergency
163. PROCTOR & VAN ZANDT, supra note 161, at 59-79.
164. John D. Lee & Neville Moray, Trust, Self Confidence, and Operator's Adaptation to
Automation, 40 INT'L J. HUMAN-COMPUT. STUDIES 153 (1994); John D. Lee & Katrina A. See,
Trust in Automation: Designing for Appropriate Reliance, 46 HUMAN FACTORS 50 (2004); Raja
Parasuraman, Thomas B. Sheridan & Christopher D. Wickens, Situation Awareness, Mental
Workload, and Trust in Automation: Viable, Empirically Supported Cognitive Engineering
Constructs, 2:2 J. OF COGNITIVE ENG'G & DECISION MAKING 142 (2008).
165. Robert R. Hoffman et al., Trust in Automation, 28 INTELLIGENT SYS. 84, 84-85
(2013).
166. Id. at 84.
167. Parasuraman et al., supra note 139, at 292.
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circumstances because the operator cannot reliably respond in time to
avoid a potentially catastrophic accident. An anesthesiologist is in a
similarly high-risk situation but utilizes lower levels of automation at
each stage to maintain familiarity with the system as it works
because, under abnormal circumstances, she may need to intervene
and take control.
If the costs that occur when the actions are incorrect or
inappropriate are high, automation may still be allowable or advisable
depending on how human involvement will protect against the risk.
When a human is never expected to take control, full automation may
be justified.
Full automation requires highly reliable error handling capabilities and the ability to
deal effectively and quickly with a potentially large number of anomalous situations. In
addition to requiring the technical capability to deal with all types of known errors, full
automation without human monitoring also assumes the ability to handle unforeseen
faults and events. This requirement currently strains the ability of most intelligent
fault-management systems.
168
The system's reliability is assessed and levels of automation
are assigned based on the system functioning improperly-because it
will.
168. Id. at 292 n.3.
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Figure 8. Beer, Fisk, and Rogers embrace fluctuating levels of
autonomy in various environments, tasks, and interactions for
deterring emerging "smart" automation.16 9
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Human factors engineers at the University of Southern
California have utilized automation models to develop an updated
framework that accounts for the mobility, various environmental
contexts, and social aspects of emerging robotics and in doing so, have
moved elements of the secondary evaluation to the beginning of the
automation assessment.7 0 Task criticality and accountability set the
stage in Guideline 1 for how automation and autonomy develop in
human-robot teams but still consider the human-centered aspects of
169. Jenay M. Beer, Arthur D. Fisk & Wendy A. Rogers, Toward a Framework for Levels
of Robot Autonomy in the Human-Robot Interaction, 3:2 J. HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTION 74, 92
(2014).
170. Id. at 91-92.
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automation as well as the unpredictability of advanced artificial
intelligence. 171
The "secondary evaluation" exercise could be enriched to serve
as what Katie Shilton calls a value lever, "practices that open new
conversations about social values and encourage consensus around
those values as design criteria. ' 172  Reflective design,173 critical
technical practice,174 participatory design,
1 75 value-sensitive design,176
values in design,77 engineering ethics,178 and other related fields offer
methods for bringing bias to the surface and challenging existing
design assumptions that may serve to enhance this evaluation stage,
but more active involvement from law and policy would provide
much-needed direction for identifying, interpreting, and resolving
larger social concerns. This involvement will require designers and
implementers of automation to expand a narrow view of evaluation
79
and for those in legal roles to resist the urge to solve complex issues
with a human or a machine or to draw convenient lines between the
two.
Policy is in sync with automation design paradigms from the
1950s and 1960s that have long evolved to recognize the sociotechnical
nature of human-automation interaction. As Dave Woods stated,
"automation that is strong, silent, and hard to direct is not a team
player."180 For automation that is more dispersed amongst sectors and
further integrated into everyday life, automation needs to be a good
team player, but also must be part of a team that reflects larger social
concerns. There is room for policy principles that support the design
171. Id.
172. Shilton, supra note 128, at 374.
173. Phoebe Sengers, Kirsten Boehner, Shay David & Joseph Kaye, Reflective Design,
2005 Proceedings of the 4th Decennial Conference on Critical Computing: Between Sense and
Sensibility 49.
174. Philip E. Agre, Toward a Critical Technical Practice: Lessons Learned in Trying to
Reform A[, in SOCIAL SCIENCE, TECHNICAL SYSTEMS AND COOPERATIVE WORK: BEYOND THE
GREAT DIVIDE (Geoffrey C. Bowker, Les Gasser, Susan Leigh Star & Bill Turner eds., 1997).
175. Peter M. Asaro, Transforming Society By Transforming Technology: The Science
and Politics of Participatory Design, 10 ACCT. MGMT. & INFO. TECH. 257, 285 (2000).
176. Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, in Human
Values and the Design of Computer Technology (Batya Friedman ed., 1997).
177. Cory Knobel & Geoffrey C. Bowker, Values in Design, 54 COMm. ACM 26, 26-28
(2011).
178. Peter-Paul Verbeek, Materializing Morality: Design Ethics and Technological
Mediation, 31:3 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 361, 362-63 (2006).
179. See generally Michael Davis, Explaining Wrongdoing, 20 J. SOC. PHIL. 74 (1989).
180. Charles E. Billings, "Issues Concerning Human-Centered Intelligent Systems:
What's 'Human Centered' and What's the Problem?", NSF Workshop on Human-Centered
Systems: Information, Interactivity, and Intelligence Talk (Feb. 17-19, 1997),
http://www.ifp.illinois.edu/nsfhcs/talksfbillings.html [http://perma.ccUGB8-XDTG].
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process instead of fighting it. Methods for promoting ethical discourse
and reflection need substantive supplementation, as well as structures
for accountability and enforcement. These sociotechnical principles
can lay the foundation for sociotechnical regulations and
implementation.
VI. FAIR AUTOMATION PRACTICES PRINCIPLES
A need for an innovative approach to the increasingly complex
nature of emerging technology does not necessarily demand a set of
principles. For instance, law professor Gary Marchant has pointed out
that expedited rulemakings, self-regulation, issue-specific legislation,
special courts, sunset clauses, periodic reviews, independent review
boards, adaptive management, and principle-based regulation are all
possible and innovative governance options.181 Principles are best
suited to these tasks because of the broad framing chosen.
Automation is not a specialized category of technology deserving
specific legislation or courts. Indeed, all of the innovative models
proposed in the field of study could be implemented for more precise
automated technologies in particular contexts if given the proper
foundational principles. Less dangerous than disrupting the loop and
more proactive than simply asking automation firms to perform risk
assessments or self-govern, utilizing existing principles developed by
man and machine automation designers can provide much-needed
guidance and a platform for more contributions from technology law
scholars, ethicists, policymakers, and the public.
Depending on the potential societal issues presented by the.
automation, flexible oversight can be more or less stringent, but such
an approach would hold designers and implementers of automation
accountable for their decisions surrounding threats to human values
like safety, privacy, dignity, and transparency by giving them the
necessary flexibility to make those determinations themselves based
on the actual and intended use of the automation. Without the
development of these principles, prescriptive regulations will be too
near-sighted; reactive, goal-setting governance will remain industry
specific; and delegation will be too lenient and overbroad. General
principles for automation have been established that could serve as a
standard for accountability, particularly if they were updated and
edited with additional social concerns and risks relevant to large-scale
integration of automation and robotics. Charles Billing's principles for
181. Gary Marchant, The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and the
Law, in GROWING GAP, supra note 13, at 28-30.
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human-centered aircraft automation are offered here by way of
example:
Figure 9. Charles E. Billings's principles for aircraft
automation, 1991.182
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These principles were outlined for aircraft automation, but
similar principles could be drafted for different fields or for more
general purposes. The principles focus on safe, functional, and
optimized man-machine performance, but do not cover everything.
182. Charles E. Billings, Human-Centered Aircraft Automation: A Concept and
Guidelines, 103885 NASA TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 81-88 (1991),
ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19910022821.pdf [http://perma.cc/53RX- X6AA].
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For instance, the principles do not have a principle or value lever for
ensuring genders are considered in the design. Some problems with
the secondary evaluation outlined above in Figure 9, which include
automation reliability and costs of automation outcomes, are that the
costs of automation outcomes are assessed at the end of the analysis,
the limited scope of risk assessment, and the lack of guidance on
ethical constraints. These are all areas where people skilled in
developing and providing such guidance should focus.
Inspired by the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs),18 3
a series of guiding principles representing acceptable actions taken
toward personal data (which include providing notice, gaining consent,
allowing access and participation to information, keeping up security
measures, and offering redress), the Fair Automation Practice
Principles (FAPPs) can lay a foundation upon which to build inclusive
design practices, strong partnerships, specific laws, tailored
regulations, and enriched jurisprudence. Similarly to FIPPs, laws can
be built upon these principles and other forms of accountability. This
initial governance step supports governing emerging technology and
the associated struggle with foreseeability and hazy expectations.
FIPPs, in some form or another, have been incorporated into nearly
every information and privacy law at every level of legislation and
regulation.184 Similarly to a privacy-by-design approach,18 5 which is
"not a specific technology or product but a systematic approach to
designing any technology that embeds privacy into the underlying
specifications or architecture,"'18 6 FAPPs could guide policymakers and
be incorporated into the design and implementation process.
Designers and implementers would then be accountable to these
principles depending on the nature of the automation, the risks
involved, and the relevant area of law.187 Related and relevant
183. Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History 1, 12 (Aug. 3, 2014),
http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf [http://perma.cc/7G2K-XTLC].
184. COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, The Governance of Privacy: Policy
Instruments in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 19 (2003).
185. See Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409
(2011); Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles, INFO. & PRIVACY
COMM'N OF ONT. (Jan. 2011), http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/resources/7foundationalprinciples.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZXW7-RTGK].
186. Rubinstein, supra note 185, at 1411-12.
187. Human factors experts have been utilized to retrospectively assess design and
implementation of products and systems since the 1970s but have been given varied receptions
in courtrooms across the country. See James M. Doyle, Applying Lawyers' Expertise to Scientific
Experts: Some Thoughts About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and
Excluding Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 654 (1984); Frank D. Fowler,
Railroad Litigation and the Human Factors Expert: Why the Plaintiff Missed the Train, 4 AM. J.
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principles and codes of ethics have been developed elsewhere. FIPPs
were drafted in the 1970s and have only recently begun to wane under
the weight of technological change.88 A code of ethics for big data was
recently drafted by Neil Richards and Jonathan King,18 9 and human-
robot interaction ethics were developed by roboticist Laurel Riek and
philosopher Don Howard.190 Borrowing significantly, synthesizing
where possible, and adapting slightly, the following are seven
principles to tie into automation that complement existing design
practices, account for actual use, and add necessary expertise. An
important difference in the nature of each FAPP is that, unlike the
FIPPs that direct what information practices must happen (e.g., data
must not be altered until its original purpose is met), the automation
principles are purposefully difficult to answer alone; they are intended
to be collectively deliberated and developed by designers, managers,
users, investors, policymakers, ethicists, and lawyers. In an effort to
achieve technologies of humility that are inclusive and adaptive, the
FAPPs are policy knots intended to be move as technology, use, and
values adjust. Each is described and then discussed in terms of two
complex forms of automation: big data automated decision making
and self-driving cars. Big data has presented new challenges because
it has allowed for new tasks to be digitally automated and others to be
created. Defined by its size, speed, and variety, big data represents
ways of discovering knowledge, solving problems, and improving
inefficiencies.191 The challenges that come with utilizing big data to
automate decision making relate to its complexity, secrecy, and
unpredictability. Self-driving cars are a product of big data in many
ways. New vehicles have the capacity to navigate and maneuver
modern streets because a great deal of information can be fed into and
processed by the machine. The emerging new role of the human
operator, previously as driver, is not well understood and has
challenged established notions of reliance, accountability, and safety.
Both big data decision making and self-driving cars create slightly
TRIAL ADvoc. 621, 624-29 (1981); Douglas R. Richmond, Human Factors Experts in Personal
Injury Litigation, 46 ARK. L. REV. 333, 339-40 (1993).
188. Fred Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in Consumer
Protection in the Age of the "Information Economy" 343, 343-44 (Jane K. Win ed., 2006).
189. Neil Richards & Jonathan King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393,
408-26 (2014).
190. Laurel D. Riek & Don Howard, A Code of Ethics for the Human-Robot Interaction
Profession, 2014 WE ROBOT CONF., http://robots.law.miami.edu/2014/wp-
content/uploads/20 14/03/a-code-of-ethics-for-the-h uman-robot-interaction-profession-riek-
howard.pdf [http://perma.cc/CBK8-49Q2].
191. See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2014).
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different man and machine systems. The human in the loop still
exists as interactor and intervener, but in different ways. Both
systems create new and different risks, while limiting others. Their
complexities require innovative interfaces to effectively account for the
humans in the loop-to maintain situational awareness and combat
automation bias, for instance. Both big data and self-driving cars may
exclude individuals or groups or have large-scale discriminatory
effects, and both may be brought into (or create) sensitive situations
related to intimate scenarios or involving private information. By
incorporating existing design frameworks and identifying places
where support is welcome or necessary, a set of FAPPs ties a policy
knot that will allow for a more flexible and effective approach to
emerging man-machine systems.
A. Risk
Automated systems should not be deployed without an
assessment of risks to the human in the loop or humans impacted by
the loop. The law's role in establishing what risks should be assessed,
how they may be satisfactorily assessed, and enforcing this
assessment is vital to all emerging technology and to tying a strong
policy knot. Identifying harms and understanding benefits is
incredibly challenging but must not be left solely to technology
companies, innovators, or developers. The social costs are listed late
in the older automation frameworks, but little guidance on how to
actually assess those social costs is provided. Larger social costs are
not built into the robotics framework above, but the operator is
emphasized. In either case, more support from law, policy, ethics, and
social sciences is needed. Risk in automated systems should be
mindful of Jasanoffs discussion and corresponding criticism that
industry and government provide tools for risk assessment,
cost-benefit analysis, and predictive modeling even in highly uncertain
contexts, but these tools are limited.192 They are focused on the
short-term, knowable risks and are less capable of accounting for
ambiguities and long-term harms.193 Additionally, risk portrayed as
mathematic rationality can preempt political conversations by
excluding those that cannot meet the demands of the dominant
discourse and is necessarily limited by initial framing constraints. 194
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There are a number of concerns surrounding the use of big data
analytics including computational errors, misclassification, poor
design, and unfair and negative impacts of application-to name a
few.195 Because big data occurs on the screen, the risks presented are
different than some of the other forms of automation in this Article,
but they are risks nonetheless. Pasquale reveals that by automating
financial decisions based on health records, for example, a
disenfranchised underclass can be created.196 The problem, of course,
is that while many systems will go through human-computer
interaction (HCI) user testing (an uncertain number will not) to assess
how the practice, the design process, does not include a greater risk
assessment associated with use of the automation. Even models that
explicitly call for risk assessment will struggle because, even in 2015,
we are still trying to develop "a broader doctrine, one capable of
assessing the various types of predictive inferences that shape life
opportunities and of weighing their benefits against their harms,"
explains Dennis Hirsch.197 Hirsch goes on to argue that the FTC can
and should use its "unfairness authority" to "distinguish predictive
practices that are in bounds, from those that are not."198 Scholars
must continue to work on developing risk assessment for harms that
derive on the screen, as well as a future without them.
Self-driving cars are a major innovation following a long series
of automation innovations from the electric starter, automatic
transmission, power steering, and anti-lock braking to electronic
stability control, cruise control, and automatic parking. Self-driving
cars promise substantial safety benefits, traffic efficiencies, and
energy conservation, but there are many complex parts that need to
work properly together in conjunction with the human (operator or
intervener) and various environmental contexts in order to achieve
potential benefits. The safety risks are somewhat obvious-cars are
big, dangerous machines-and so self-driving cars have been road
tested. In April 2014, Google announced their vehicles had logged
700,000 autonomous miles and, in May 2015, unveiled a vehicle with
195. See generally Kord Davis, Ethics of Big Data: Balancing Risk and Innovation (2012);
Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How
We Live, Work, and Think (2014); Privacy, Big Data, and the Public Good (Julia Lane, Victoria
Stodden, Stefan Bender, & Helen Nissenbaum eds., 2014).
196. PASQUALE, supra note 36.
197. Dennis D. Hirsh, That's Unfair! Or is it? Big Data, Discrimination and the FTC's
Unfairness Authority, 103 KY. L.J. 345, 347 (2015).
198. Id. at 5.
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no steering wheel or pedals.199 While these systems will not likely
have the kinks worked out for another few years, the risks of them
working properly or improperly, being innovated upon or abused, and
used by the "good guys" or the "bad guys" has to be built into the
structure of autonomy chosen for the man-machine systems that will
once again change transportation.
B. Transparency
Automated systems should be comprehensible and support
situational awareness through effective transparency. Unless there
are no risks involved in the practice of an automated system, black
boxes are bad design. This will be perceived as an unpopular, anti-
innovation principle, but when an operator does not know what a
system is doing because of the opaqueness of its design, then error
recognition, intervention, and resolution are timely and costly, if not
impossible. Pressing forward with black box designs (and the
individual harms and social fallout that follow) will likely slow the
integration of sophisticated automation and intelligent systems into
society.
Big data automated decision making and self-driving cars seem
to have different risks associated with them today, but self-driving
cars depend on information gathering, processing, and decision
analysis just as big data-driven automated decisions do. When
discussing big data automated decision making, scholars like Citron
and Pasquale have focused on the screen, featuring databases that
sort out those that qualify for loans or welfare benefits.200 While a
self-driving car may cause physical and immediate harm, financial
determinations can have significant negative impacts as well, and
both must offer a level of transparency that allows for the human in
the loop to optimize the system. It must be considered unacceptable to
build a system to assess users, patients, students, clients, or
applicants and then to abandon it. A human must understand what is
happening and why.
Self-driving cars will need to be transparent enough for
operators and interveners to maintain situational awareness and
understand how to act if and when necessary, taking into account skill
degradation and mental workload effects. Particularly because the
199. Gail Sulivan, Google's New Driverless Car Has No Brakes or Steering Wheel, WASH.
POST, (May 28, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/O5/28/googles-
new-driverless-car-has-no-brakes-or-steering-wheell [http://perma.cc/2BEZ-2HR7].
200. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014).
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risks associated with driving are incredibly tangible and high, this
amount of black boxing must be limited. Citron and Pasquale have
argued for transparency in automated scoring systems that would
provide accountability. This would require access to datasets, source
code, programmer notes describing the variables, and
correlations-anything required to "be able to meaningfully assess
systems whose predictions change pursuant to Al logic."20 1 These
justifications are incredibly important, but stretch this principle of
transparency, which focuses on the operator knowing what is
happening with the system and why. However, transparency for the
purposes of accountability is made possible by transparent systems
generally.
C. Errors and Limitations
Automated system failures should not be surprising, silent, or
irresolvable. "[S]ystems should never be permitted to fail in
silence[;] '20 2 impacts from errors occurring in digital automation may
be immediate and buried in a pile of algorithms. Situational
awareness, mental workload, skill degradation, and automation bias
must be considered when designing error detection and considering
limitations. This is particularly true when errors that occur
infrequently and are associated with high risks or limitations of the
system require only frequent-but skilled-interaction. Alarms must
be set appropriately for the situational use of digital automation with
the right level of sensitivity for the risks involved. Errors must not
only be flagged but also resolvable, which relates to the need for
transparency. Sometimes a system will work as intended but create
unintended results, at which point intervention must be possible and
effective. Even well functioning systems will have limitations,
negatively impacting human interactors by creating inappropriate
levels of trust or by decreasing situational awareness. These
limitations may change as environments, tasks, or circumstances
change. Human users should be aware of their own limitations as
operators, interactors, or interveners, as well as the limitations of an
optimized and well functioning man and machine system. Citron's
work on public benefit systems reveals a large number of errors
occurring without any good way to alert operators or resolve issues in
a timely manner.20 3 Systems may rely on humans to detect errors but
201. Id. at 25.
202. Billings, supra note 182, at 85.
203. See Citron, supra note 55, at 1279.
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must provide the tools to do so. The system must be designed with
failure in mind. Depending on the nature of the errors, resolutions
should be timely and fit the harm caused by the error. Self-driving
cars will need to be designed in such a way that errors are sensitively
set so that human operators will trust that something is wrong,
instead of ignoring or disabling the alarm. Human factors engineers
are experienced with interface design within the vehicle,20 4 but the
limitations of self-driving vehicles may provide a new challenge.20 5 It
is important for operators and implementers of automation to be
aware of and understand the limitations of a system. For example,
self-driving cars are not yet good at navigating leaf-covered roads, and
data categories are often simplistic when assigning gender-an
operator should be aware of this so that errors can be better assessed
when they occur or go unnoticed by the machine.
D. Diversity and Discrimination
Automated systems should reflect on biases and choices during
design and test for discriminatory impacts and diverse users. The
lack of diversity amongst engineers and computer scientists has been
well documented. Designers should consider their own backgrounds
and physical features when reflecting on choices. Automation that
creates barriers based on race, gender, or ability may want to be
reconsidered. Systems should be tested for discriminatory impact.
Big data's disparate impact has recently been the topic of many
symposia and an FTC workshop.206 Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst
explain:
Sorting and selecting for the best or most profitable candidates means generating a
model with winners and losers. If data miners are not careful, that sorting might create
disproportionately adverse results concentrated within historically disadvantaged
groups in ways that look a lot like discrimination.... Approached without care,
datamining can reproduce existing patterns of discrimination, inherit the prejudice of
prior decision- makers, or simply reflect the widespread biases that persist in society.2 0 7
204. See generally Human Factors in Automotive Design (Society of Automotive
Engineers eds., 2001).
205. Although one not unanticipated, see P.A. Hancock & Raja Parasuraman, Human
Factors and Safety in the Design of Intelligent Vehicle-Highway Systems (IVHS), 23 J. OF SAFETY
RES. 181, 183-84 (1992), these limitations will be different than those in previous decades as
users have gained some sense of how to interact with "smart" devices and environments.
206. See e.g., Latanya Sweeney, Chief Technologist, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at Big
Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion? (Sept. 15, 2014).
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Using the Street Bump application as an example, Kate
Crawford explains how the city of Boston must be careful in using the
data collected from accelerometers in smart phones that detect when
potholes are driven over because there is an uneven distribution of
smartphones and application users across populations.208  From
collection and categories to analysis and use, the widespread use of big
data automated decision making raises significant discrimination
concerns. To illustrate, Barocas and Selbst find Title VII liability for
disparate treatment and disparate impact ill-suited to the task of
regulating discrimination in big data analytics used for
employment.20 9 Citron and Pasquale have proposed giving the FTC
access to scoring systems that unfairly harm consumers so that the
agency's technologists could test the systems for bias, arbitrariness,
and unfair mischaracterizations.210 Finding significant constitutional
and political barriers to implementing needed reform, Barocas and
Selbst suggest that non-legal solutions may be appropriate.
211
Incorporating Shilton's value levers related to discriminatory
decisions and outcomes may have the most impact until reform is
possible.
Self-driving cars will need to consider what biases are built
into designs as well. Algorithmic decisions manage the system and
will make difficult choices in what to hit when a vehicular accident is
inevitable. Situations and circumstances unfamiliar to the designers
may present themselves. The physical layout of the vehicle and the
interfaces will need to account for the diversity of drivers, including
various genders, ages, abilities, and backgrounds. Users will adapt to
these systems, but whose driving experience will they adapt to?
Automation designers should reflect on such questions.
E. Sensitive Situations
Automated systems should account for sensitive situations and
information preferences of the humans in the loop. Sensitive
situations, like those that deal with sensitive information, private
places, or vulnerable populations should be assessed with an
appropriate level of care and expertise. Of course, this principle is
tightly tied to the previous principle of diversity and discrimination.
208. Kate Crawford, The Hidden Biases in Big Data, HARV. Bus. REV. (Apr. 1, 2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data/ [http://perma.cc/J3RB-HXLE].
209. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 207, at 46.
210. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 200, at 25.
211. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 207, at 61.
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It is important that automation is designed with foresight and diverse
perspectives.
Big data conversations have previously been dominated by
issues related to sensitive situations. Most notoriously, Target
devised a system for identifying and targeting women early in
pregnancy so as to capture their buying power from baby shower to
first birthday. In doing so, the company mailed a teenage high school
student living at home coupons for baby products.212 The teenager was
in fact pregnant, but Target had divulged this information to her
parents, and its practices of "knowing" a woman was pregnant before
she told friends and family were widely considered invasive.213
Humans devised this system and were involved in its implementation,
but no special attention was paid to the sensitive nature of using
buying habits to suggest health conditions, informing others about
pregnancy, or the age or cultural situations of those being targeted.
More recently, Facebook manipulated what content appeared to
689,003 randomly selected users-positive or negative posts-to study
how emotions spread across social media.214 Although users consent to
these kinds of tests when they agree to the site's terms of services by
creating an account, it was troubling to many who were concerned
about the impact of fiddling with users' emotional states without
explicit notice.215 "I wonder if Facebook KILLED anyone with their
emotion manipulation stunt. At their scale and with depressed people
out there, it's possible," privacy activist Lauren Weinstein posted on
Twitter.216 An outcry resulted because the study revealed the power
platform operators have over users, that the company acted with
limited foresight, and that preferences were not necessarily taken into
account.217 Personal information that is collected at the information
acquisition stage, sorted through in the analysis phase, perhaps
isolated in the decision phase, and acted upon in the action stage




214. Vindu Goel, Facebook Tinkers with Users' Emotions in News Feed Experiment,




216. Lauren Weinstein (@LaurenWeinstein), TWITER (June 28, 2014, 5:55 PM),
https:/Htwitter.com/laurenweinstein/status/483051171255312384 [http://perma.cctH6W3-GL62].
217. Kashmir Hill, After the Freak-Out Over Facebook's Emotion Manipulation Study,




THE IRONIES OF AUTOMATION LAW
should not be overlooked and will be more relevant with increasing
automation; a high level of consciousness must be built into an
automation system's design and implementation, particularly when
sensitive populations, information, or situations may be involved.
Self-driving vehicles will also be put in sensitive situations.
Users may say or do things in vehicles or while driving that they may
consider private and wish not to share with particular parties such as
the government or an insurance company.218 Of course, a number of
features have already been added to cars that collect and track
information, such as hands-free calling systems219 and devices that
allow for personalized insurance rates.220  However, as more
sophisticated automation is integrated into more environments and
contexts, it may be increasingly difficult for users to provide consent
or participate in information collection and use. Signaling information
preferences, such as "do not map my face" or "do not identify me," is
difficult in an Internet of Things221 environment that provides many
sources of collection with few screens available for members of the
public to convey their preferences.222 Information collected about
others while driving may include fellow drivers and cars, pedestrians,
cyclists, and activity on private and public property. How to collect,
analyze, use, and share this information will need to be considered.
F. Man-Machine Comparison
An automated system's design and implementation should
locate the human in the loop and reassess the system's impact on the
human and larger social values. Instead of dividing up aspects of a
task by talents of man versus talents of machine, this principle
informs those in the development and implementation of automation
to consider changes by allocating aspects of automation a certain way.
218. Timothy B. Lee, Self-driving Cars Are a Privacy Nightmare. And It's Totally Worth
It, WASH. POST, (May 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.comfblogs/
wonkblog/wp/2013/05/2 1/self-driving-cars-are-a-privacy-nightmare-and-its-totally-worth-it/
[http://perma.cc/A27P-JFDB].
219. See, e.g., ONSTAR, https://www.onstar.com/us/en/services/connections.html
[http://perma.cc/JE4M-MPCL] (describing OnStar's hands free calling).
220. See, e.g., PROGRESSIVE, http://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshot-common-
questions/ [http://perma.cc/P4XP-T6PJ (describing Progressive's Snapshot, which tracks driving
habits to "personalize your insurance rate based on your actual driving").
221. "Internet of Things" refers to a category of objects newly fashioned with sensors and
connected to the internet and each other. Bill Wasik, In the Programmable World, All Our
Objects Will Act as One, Wired (May 14, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/05/internet-of-things-
2/ [http://perma.cc/ZW5P-YP48].
222. Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & The Internet of Other People's Things,
IDAHO L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
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We are often quick to point out the limitations of new forms of
automation, but we must also consider the downsides of not utilizing
the automation and relying more heavily on human engagement. This
conception begins by locating and tracking the human in the loop in a
more expansive way, considering an imperfect human in a loop as well
as those humans tangentially impacted. We must develop a way to
assess and think about this principle in a way that effectively locates
and accounts for the ever-present humans in the loop. A discussion of
what critical decisions are to be made by humans (and why) and how
to limit automation bias and moral buffers in those instances would be
an incredible contribution to the guidance of automation. Much of
digital automation is incorporated incrementally. Big data automated
decision making was not previously performed by a human using no
tools at his disposal. Slight changes in function allocation or levels of
autonomy must be reflected upon to assess changes in the system and
their associated impacts. Bankston and Stepanovich perform this
principle beautifully in their We Robot 2014 article, When Robot Eyes
are Watching You: The Law & Policy of Automated Communications
Surveillance.223 The authors work through two scenarios, one where a
set of computers is analyzing email communication and flagging it for
further analysis and one where a human is doing the exact same
tasks. Relying on cases that recognize the interdependence of man
and machine, Bankston and Stepanovich find that invasions occur at
the point of collection, not human interpretation.224 For instance, in
1976, the Fifth Circuit established an important doctrine interpreting
"interception" under the wiretap statute in United States v Turk.225
When the police seized an audio recording of a telephone conversation
from a vehicle, the question became whether the subsequent listening
by human officers qualified as an interception of the call. The court
explained that it did not-that the interception had occurred when the
device collected the information, not when the humans heard the
information.226 Explaining further:
In a forest devoid of living listeners, a tree falls. Is there a sound? The answer is yes, if
an active tape recorder is present, and the sound might be thought of as "aurally
acquired" at (almost) the instant the action causing it occurred. For § 2510(4) purposes,
the recorder can be the agent of the ear.
22 7
A previous case, Smith v. Maryland, dominates Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence because it provides foundation for
223. Bankston & Stephanovich, supra note 81.
224. See id.
225. United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658-59 (5th Cir. 1976).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 658, n.2.
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interpreting third-party doctrine in modern contexts. In Smith, the
Supreme Court found no meaningful distinction between man and
machine for the purposes of protecting privacy.228 Instead, the Court
found that monitoring non-content dialing information for twenty-four
hours did not violate any expectations of privacy (and so was not an
unconstitutional search), because it had previously held that
individuals could hold no expectation of privacy for this information as
it was knowingly disclosed to a third party (the telephone company):
When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the
telephone company and "exposed" that information to its equipment in the ordinary
course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would
reveal to police the numbers he dialed. The switching equipment that processed those
numbers is merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day,
personally completed calls for the subscriber. Petitioner concedes that if he had placed
his calls through an operator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy. We
are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional result is required because the
telephone company has decided to automate.
229
These cases represent man and machine legal approaches,
because they consider the technology as an agent of humans or a part
of a human system. In undertaking this comparison, Bankston and
Stepanovich argue that expectations of privacy from invasions by the
government are more vulnerable when analytics are not considered as
a part of the search or seizure process because their scale is massive,
even if they arguably lead to less embarrassment or self-consciousness
surrounding specific personal information.
230
Self-driving cars will need to make similar assessments,
accounting for the human driver or operator who will have to interact
or intervene in some situations whether to maneuver the vehicle
through uninterpretable terrain, redirect a vehicle from a distance, or
repair a machine that is failing at certain tasks. Courts will have to
assess whether the human has been properly considered in the design
of error detection systems and warnings. Shifting roles in
man-machine systems require a reflection on how responsibilities shift
as well and whether values are protected through that shift.
G. Predictability
Automated systems should be initially and continually
inventoried for predictable and unpredictable behavior. One of the
most challenging aspects of emerging technology is its
unpredictability, but the novelty and value of emerging technology
228. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
229. Id. at 744-45.
230. Bankston & Stephanovich, supra note 81, at 1.
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today is its adaptability and unpredictability. These aspects of
modern automation will no doubt require a legal overhaul, but no one
is in a better position than designers and implementers to assess a
technology's type and level of unpredictability. Automation is
predictable. A Roomba is not going to fly-its design prevents such
action. A drone is not going to drive down the sidewalk. Security
analytics are not going to start talking and giving people bad driving
directions. Considering unpredictability supports mindful integration
into society.
Judge Curtis E.A. Karnow described the types of technology
most challenging for traditional tort liability to handle as those that
operate using machine learning, such as "genetic algorithms, neural
nets, or other sorts of feedback loops which generate unpredictable
behavior.' 231 He goes on:
That is, these robots are given instructions as to ultimate goals and determine for
themselves the means of accomplishing these goals. The means are not predictable by
either the operator-owner or by the original programmers. Rather, the software teaches
itself by running experiments or making other sorts of real or virtual attempts at a
solution, corrects for error and approximates a result which it then implements.
2 3 2
But everything and everyone is limited by design; we may beat
the odds, anomalies will arise, and the unimaginable will raise
eyebrows. However, if we are paying attention, we will be less
shocked by technological outcomes. By inventorying predictable
behavior, a range of possible adaptations, and tracking systems in the
lab and in situated contexts (which requires transparency, risk
assessment, and error detection), it will be more difficult to be caught
off guard. A predictability inventory is an exercise that will help
guide designers, the public, and policymakers. This is a principle that
will gain refinement and precision with practice, but should be
undertaken in order to analytically consider unpredictability.
A key feature of big data is that by processing massive
amounts of data using elegant algorithms, new and unexpected
insights are produced. Automated decision making based on
unexpected insights can present problems when not designed properly
or sensitively, but predictability is laced throughout what is
considered an unpredictable innovation. The context in which the
system operates provides some level of predictability. For instance,
the Target study could reveal that woman who have recently become
pregnant crave and buy alcohol even though risks increase when
231. Curtis E.A. Karnow, The Application of Traditional Tort Theory to Embodied
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alcohol consumption during pregnancy occurs.23 3 Although surprising,
this is not unpredictable. Target is looking for insights into what is
consumed during early pregnancy. If Target decided to send coupons
for diapers and alcohol to pregnant women, without anyone noticing or
error detection catching the problem, it would be because the
designers, operators, or implementers did not consider what was
possible given the level of autonomy and function allocation between
human and machine. Target's use of big data automated decision
making is not likely to predict a number of scenarios or perform a
number of tasks. Similarly, self-driving cars will behave
unpredictably based on machine learning and operator peculiarities
while remaining tied into the system and providing transparency,
error detection, and other human-centered esign and implementation
decisions that will limit nasty surprises.
Each of the legal case studies above involved a harm perceived
as one technology either caused or could resolve. None of them
involved assessing the risks of a change in the loop. Certainly railroad
safety and traffic safety would have been well served by situated-use
testing to support the risks involved in adjusting the level of
autonomy in the particular man-machine system. The EU data
protection regulations do not consider whether forcing a human in the
loop increases or decreases the likelihood of an error in a given
situation.23 4 These efforts are all well intentioned, but the man versus
machine approach has not provided the right perspective to
understand or complement the man-machine systems. The FAPPs
provide a tool for approaching each, but do not specifically address any
one problem. The set of principles is likely incomplete and certainly
underdeveloped, but even guide rails need to be fine-tuned.
235
VII. CONCLUSION
"It all just seemed so good the way we had it, back before
everything became automatic," sings Miranda Lambert.23
6 Nostalgia
has always been a popular theme in country music but should be
handled with care when contemplating technological change. Indeed,
nostalgia ignores the new computational environment and the very
different expectations humans situate themselves within.
233. See discussion supra Section VI.E.
234. See supra Section V.B.
235. Jarvis D. Michie & Bronstad E. Maurice, Highway Guardrails: Safety Feature or
Roadside Hazard?, TRANSP. RESEARCH RECORD 1468 (1994).
236. MIRANDA LAMBERT, Automatic, on PLATINUM (RCA Records 2014).
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The Defense Science Board was right when it explained that
defining levels of autonomy "deflects focus from the fact that all
autonomous systems are joint human-machine cognitive systems, thus
resulting in brittle design" and that "all systems are supervised by
humans to some degree, and the best capabilities result from the
coordination and collaboration of humans and machines.' 237 Man and
machine systems are the best systems but present the hardest
problems. They are hard to design well and responsibly, hard to
predict, and hard to govern. The ironies of automation have resulted
because of a man-versus-machine approach to automation and the
irony of automation law result for the same reason. A human will
always be in the loop, at a minimum, as interactor or intervener in
digital automation. By focusing on the humans in the loop,
automation law may be able to resolve its own ironies.
This requires recognition of the fact that law can break a well-
formed loop of the need for flexibility in man-machine design and
implementation and an understanding of design and implementation
practices. Moving a human in or out of the loop is both ineffective
(because a human is always in the loop) and dangerous (because her
existing role in the loop may have been the key to keeping the system
reliable). Creating policy knots by aligning legal treatment with
frameworks for responsible design, locating moments where legal
expertise would serve the process, and identifying holes where
important societal concerns are overlooked will help the law account
for the flexibility necessarily involved in man-machine systems and
adaptive to new innovations.
As we attempt to grapple with the new, identify and forecast
innovation, and anticipate governance issues, it is important to
acknowledge the incremental nature of innovation and tie where we
are to where we are trying to go. This broad perspective provides an
analysis that links a number of overlapping issues under a single,
expansive, unifying concept but does not blind us to exceptional
innovations that require a long, hard look at assumptions.
237. DEF. SCI. BD., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN
DOD SYSTEMS 23--24 (July 2012), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7S5Q-KSQP].
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